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David M. Tanovich*

Law's Ambition and the Reconstruction
of Role Morality in Canada

There is a growing disconnect and alienation between lawyers and the legal
profession in Canada. One cause, which is the focus of the article, is philosophical
in nature. There appears to be a disconnect between the role lawyers want to
pursue (i.e., a facilitator of justice) and the role that they perceive the profession
demands they play (i.e., a hired gun). The article argues that this perception is
a mistaken one. Over the last fifteen years, we have been engaged in a process
of role morality reconstruction. Under this reconstructed institutional role, an
ethic of client-centred zealous advocacy has slowly begun to be replaced with
a justice-seeking ethic that seeks to give effect to law's ambition. Part I of the
article provides the basic foundations of this reconstruction thesis. In the first
section, role morality is defined and defended as a beacon of ethical reflection.
The next section attempts to trace the evolution of our understanding of the public
interest. The final section of Part I provides the evidence of this reconstructed role
morality by exploring statements from leading members of the profession, recent
ethics jurisprudence and by examining equality and harm prevention principles
in our codes of conduct. Like any large bureaucratic institution, the profession will
inevitably be slow to respond to its new identity and the changing set of norms
and values that go with that identity. The required institutional changes are beyond
the scope of this article. However, Part II does address how lawyers can on an
individual level give effect to this evolving role morality by adopting a pervasive
justice-seeking ethic and by engaging in identity lawyering that is consistent with
the interests of justice.
Au Canada, on constate que Ia dichotomie et IPalidnationentre les avocats et la
profession juridique sont en croissance. Cet article avance que Iune des causes
de cette dichotomie et de cette alienation est dordre philosophique. II semble
exister une dichotomie entre le r6le que les avocats veulent jouer (intervenants
qui favorisent I'application de la justice) et le r6le qu'ils croient que la profession
leur impose (mercenaires au service de leurs clients). Lauteur de cet article
allegue que cette perception est sans fondement. Depuis plus de quinze ans,
nous avons 6ts actifs dans un processus de reconstruction de la morait6. Dans
ce r6le institutionnel reconstitu6, une 6thique de representation partiale et sectaire
axee sur le client a lentement cede la place J une 6thique de recherche de justice
qui vise 6 realiserI'ambition du droit. La premiere partie de Particle 6tablit les
bases de cette those de reconstruction. Dans la premiere section de cette partie,
le rele de moralit6 est defini et d6fendu en tant que modele d'Othique. Dans
la section suivante, Iauteur tente de tracer I'Ovolution de notre perspective de
I'interetpublic. Dans la derniere section de la partie II, il donne la preuve de cette
moralit6 reconstituee en examinant les temoignages de membres 6minents de la
profession, la jurisprudence recente sur I'uthique et les principes d'6galite et de
prevention de prejudices dans nos codes de conduite. A I'instarde toute grande
institution bureaucratique, la profession mettra inevitablement beaucoup de
temps J rsagira cette nouvelle identit et aux normes et aux valeurs changeantes
qui Iaccompagnent. Les changements institutionnels requis vont au-dela de la
portee de cet article. Toutefois, dans la partie II, I'auteurtraite des fagons dont les
avocats peuvent, individuellement, donner suite 6 cette moralit en Ovolution en
adoptant une thique profonde de recherche de la justice et en pratiquant leur
profession de mani~re conforme aux inter~ts de la justice.
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Introduction
There is a growing disconnect and alienation between lawyers and the
legal profession in this country. A 2004 survey, for example, discovered

that "lawyers were more dissatisfied than other professionals" and that
they perceived their work as generally "not particularly relevant to society
as a whole."' Indeed, many recent graduates and more seasoned lawyers
would likely agree with the following diagnosis provided by William
Simon at the commencement of his ethics treatise The Practice of Justice
Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. This article was presented as the 2005 F.B. Wickwire
Lecture, Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University. It was also awarded the 2006 CALT scholarly paper
award. An earlier version of the piece was presented at the Fourth Colloquium On The Legal Profession
(The Chief Justice of Ontario's Advisory Committee on Professionalism, Faculty of Law, University
of Windsor) (3 March 2005). I wish to thank William Simon, Rose Voyvodic, Bruce Elman, Aaron
Dhir, Paul Perell, Jim Vanro, Richard Devlin, Allan Hutchinson, Rosemary Cairns Way, Liz Sheehy,
David Layton and Don Stuart for providing helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also wish to thank
Michelle Booth, Chris Uwagboe, Saman Wickramasinghe and Chris Jackson who presented critiques
of an earlier draft for their seminar presentation and paper in my Legal Profession seminar at Windsor.
I also wish to thank the research assistance of Alex Procope and the generous funding of the Law
Foundation of Ontario. All errors are mine.
I.
See Chief Justice Roy McMurtry, "The Legal Profession and Public Service" presented at the
Third Colloquium (Ottawa) (Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004) online: Law Society of Upper
Canada
<http://www.lsuc.on.ca/news/pdf/third colloquium mcmurtry.pdf> (date accessed: 10
February 2005). See also the discussion in Fiona M. Kay, Cristi Masuch & Paula Curry, Diversity and
Change: The Contemporary Legal Profession In Ontario (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada,
2004) at 120 [Diversity and Change].
*
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- "[n]o social role encourages such ambitious moral aspirations as the
lawyer's, and no social role so consistently disappoints the aspirations it
encourages." 2 Why is this happening? What is it about the law school and
lawyering experiences that is creating such despair and discontent?
The etiology of this discontent is complex. Some of the problems
are structural in nature. They include, for example, the presence of
systemic biases in entry and mobility for groups traditionally excluded
from the profession.3 Other structural problems include: barriers to
justice4 ; the commodification and corporatization of legal practice'; the
lack of consistent and meaningful enforcement of ethical and regulatory
prohibitions 6; and finally, the failure of many law schools to provide an
environment in which students can develop the necessary skills, judgment,
and cultural competence to engage in an ethical and meaningful practice
of law.7
Beyond structure, the profession suffers from chronic disrespect and
a lack of public confidence in it.' As Justice Abella of the Supreme Court
2.
See William H. Simon, The Practiceof Justice: A Theory ofLawyers 'Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1998) at 1 [The Practiceof Justice]. I owe a great debt to Professor Simon
for providing me with the theory and tools to understand and embark upon this exploration of role
morality in Canada.
3.
See generally the discussion in Diversity and Change, supra note I at I-11, 119-120; Fiona M.
Kay, Cristi Masuch & Paula Curry, Turning Points and Transitions: Women s Careers in the Legal
Profession (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004) 1-17, 106-111; Charles C. Smith, "Who is
Afraid of the Big Bad Social Constructionists? Or Shedding Light on the Unpardonable Whiteness of
the Canadian Legal Profession" presented at the Fourth Colloquium (Windsor) (Law Society of Upper
Canada, 2005), online: Law Society of Upper Canada <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/news /updates/define_
prof.jsp> ; Merrill Cooper, Joan Brockman & Irene Hoffart, Final Report On Equity and Diversity in
Alberta's Legal Profession (Calgary: Law Society ofAlberta, Jan. 2004) at i-iii (Executive Summary);
Gerry Ferguson & Kuan Foo, Addressing DiscriminatoryBarriersFacingA boriginalLaw Students and
Lawyers (Vancouver: Law Society of British Columbia, April 2000); Chris Tennant, "Discrimination
in the Legal Profession, Codes of Professional Conduct and the Duty of Non-Discrimination" (1992)
15 Dal. L.J. 464 [Duty of Non-Discrimination].
4.
See generally Richard Devlin, "Breach of Contract?: The New Economy, Access to Justice
and the Ethical Responsibilities of the Legal Profession" (2002) 25 Dal. L.J. 335 at 351 [Breach of
Contract].
5.
See generally Gavin MacKenzie, "The Valentine's Card In The Operating Room: Codes of
Ethics and the Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession" (1994-1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 859 at 859-865
[The Valentine s CardIn The OperatingRoom].
6.
See generally Harry W. Arthurs, "Dead Parrot: Does Professional Self-Regulation Exhibit Vital
Signs" (1994-1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 800 [Dead Parrot].
For example, only Alberta, Manitoba, Western, New Brunswick and Dalhousie have mandatory
7.
ethics courses in Canada. See the discussion of mandatory ethics courses in Jocelyn Downie, "A Case
For Compulsory Legal Ethics Education In Canadian Law Schools" (1997) 20 Dal. L.J. 244. See
also the discussion of law school pedagogy and cultural competence in Rose Voyvodic, "Advancing
The Justice Ethic Through Cultural Competence" presented at the Fourth Colloquium (Windsor: Law
Society of Upper Canada, 2005), online: Law Society of Upper Canada <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/news/
pdf/fourth colloquiumvoyvodic.pdf> (date accessed: 18 April 2005) [Advancing The Justice Ethic].
See e.g., Michael Wilhelmson, "Public's Perception Of B.C. Lawyers Found To Be Slipping"
8.
The Lawyers Weekly (26 March 2004).
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of Canada has observed "the intensity of the public's disaffection is now
so palpable that it has started to affect the profession's own perception of
its professionalism." 9 This lack of public respect has only been heightened
with a number of highly publicized cases involving over-zealous conduct
including the now infamous Ken Murray case.' ° As Kent Roach notes
"[the case] has been something of a mini-Enron for the legal profession."' "I
The same can be said with the growing systemic problem of prosecutorial
zeal in criminal cases. 2
The final cause, which is the focus of this article, is philosophical in
nature. It concerns the role morality or raison d' tre of the profession.
In my opinion, there is a disconnect between the role lawyers want to
pursue (i.e., a facilitator of justice) and the role that they perceive the
profession demands they play (i.e., a zealous advocate). This disconnect
is evident in a 1994 empirical study of lawyers in Ontario. 3 Forty-nine
of the 154 lawyers whose interviews were analyzed by the researchers
raised the issue of the lawyering role when discussing problems they had
experienced in practice. Interestingly, all forty-nine lawyers started out

9.
"Professionalism Revisited" (14 October 1999), online: Ontario Courts <http://www.
ontariocourts.on.ca/courtof appeal/speeches/professionalism.htm> (date accessed: I February 2005)
[Professionalism Revisited].
10. Murray kept in his possession videotapes depicting his client's (Paul Bernardo) involvement in
the rape and torture of his victims. While he did eventually disclose the tapes, the damage had already
been done. As a result of Murray's conduct, Bernardo's accomplice, Karla Homolka, was able to
secure a plea bargain that sent her to jail for only twelve years. Murray was charged with obstruction of
justice and acquitted. See R. v. Murray (2000), 144 C.C.C. (3d) 322 (Ont. S.C.). Disciplinary charges
against Murray were also eventually withdrawn. See the discussion of the Murray case in a forum at
(2001) 50 U.N.B.L.J. 171-277 and (2003), 47 Crim. L. Q. 141-223.
11. "Ethics and Criminal Justice" (2003) 47 Crim. L. Q. 121 at 121. See also the discussion in
Michel Proulx & David Layton, Ethics and CanadianCriminalLaw (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 1-2
[Ethics and CanadianCriminalLaw].
12. See, for example, the recent case involvingArnold Piragoff, one ofAlberta's top Crown Attorneys.
Piragoff was found liable for malicious prosecution and reprimanded by the Law Society of Alberta
for his role in the Jason Dix prosecution. Dix was charged with two counts of first degree murder and
spent 22 months in custody before his charges were eventually dismissed. Piragoff misled the court
at Dix's bail hearing. As evidence that Dix posed a danger, Piragoff presented a letter, purportedly
written by a police informant Dix had met in jail, which offered to kill Dix's girlfriend, a potential
Crown witness. Piragoff was aware, however, that the letter had, in fact, been written by two RCMP
officers, in conjunction with the informant, as a ploy to get Dix to confess. Indeed, during a break,
an RCMP officer reminded him of this fact. Piragoff did nothing to correct the mistake and Dix was
denied bail. See Dix v. Canada(A.G.), [2002] A.J. No. 784 (Q.B.). See also Paula Simons, "No Justice
In Wrist Slap By Law Society: Prosecutor Deserved Sterner Sanctions" Edmonton Journal (21 May
2005) B I; Charles Rusnell "Dix Prosecutor Fined For Misleading Court: Actions A- Shade Short' Of
Deliberate" Edmonton Journal(19 May 2005) A 1.
13. See Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Christa Walker & Peter Mercer, "Testing Theory and Debunking
Stereotypes: Lawyers' Views On The Practice Of Law" (2005) 18 Can. J.L. & Jur. 165 [Testing
Theory]. See also, Peter Mercer, Margaret Ann Wilkinson, and Terra Strong, "The Practice of Ethical
Precepts: Dissecting Decision-Making By Lawyers" (1996) 9 Can. J.L. & Jur. 141 at 153.
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in the role of a counsellor applying an ethic of care.14 In twenty-nine
cases, that role at some point conflicted with the instructions of the client.
Four lawyers resolved that conflict by substituting their own judgment
for that of the client while another seven lawyers withdrew from the case.
The remaining eighteen lawyers ultimately adopted a hired gun role even
though ten of them continued to experience stress and internal conflict. In
their conclusions, the authors of the study observed that
[a]lthough most lawyers, in the end, relinquished their decision-making
to their clients', this transition from counselor to hired gun, mandatedby
their professionalobligations,was one fraught with challenge for many

lawyers. Lawyers resolved their problems in these areas, not by resort to
official sources such as their code of conduct, but by resort to internal,
informal sources of information such as mentors ...
Finally, this research amply demonstrates that ...lawyers are preoccupied
with the constant tensions of specific solicitor-client relationships and
the lawyer's overall obligations to society. 5
But is this hired gun role now "mandated by [our] professional
obligations"?
There is no question that historically, the philosophy of lawyering
in Canada has largely been driven by principles of partisanship, zealous
advocacy, and morally unaccountable representation within the bounds of
the law. 16 It is an ethic that many trace back to Lord Brougham's speech in
Queen Caroline's case 7 :
14. As the authors note, in this role "the lawyer must weigh competing and concurrent third party
interests, as well as those of the client, in order to decide how to advise the client. The lawyer must
consequently thoroughly weigh all available options and encourage the client to be thoughtful in
making the ultimate decision" See Testing Theory, supra note 13 at 172 and 178.
15. Supra note 13 at 190 [emphasis added].
16. See John R. Cartwright, "An Address To Convocation By The Chief Justice of Canada" (1968)
2 Gazette 6 at 6-7; George Finlayson, "The Lawyer As A Professional" (1980) 14 Gazette 229 at
230, 235 [Lawyer As A Professional];Chrysler Credit CanadaLtd. v. 734925 Ontario Ltd. (1991),
5 O.R. (3d) 65 at 69 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.); Marvin Joel Huberman, "Advocacy, War, and the Art of
Strategy" (1992) 26 Gazette 122; Gavin MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics: ProfessionalResponsibility
and Discipline (Toronto: Carswell, 2001) at 1-9 - 1-10 [Lawyers and Ethics]; R. v. Felderof(2003),
180 C.C.C. (3d) 498 at 536 (Ont. C.A.); David Layton, "The Criminal Defence Lawyer's Role" (2004)
27 Dal. L.J. 379 at 381-382 [The CriminalDefence Lawyer s Role].
17. In 1820, King George IV of England wanted to remove his wife Caroline as Queen and to
dissolve their marriage. In order to accomplish this task, a bill was entered in the House of Lords.
The charge was that Caroline had committed adultery. The inquiry became, in effect, "The Trial of
Queen Caroline." Henry Brougham, later Lord Chancellor, was chosen as her legal counsel. During
the trial, he gave notice that he intended to prove that the King had previously married in secret. Many
thought that proof of this might bring down the monarchy. In doing so, Brougham gave what is now
one of the most famous speeches on role morality. The Bill was eventually withdrawn by the King.
Caroline died shortly after King George's coronation. See online: <http:/lwww.loyno.edu/history/
joumal/Mouledoux.html> (date accessed: 20 February 2005); William H. Simon, "'Thinking Like A
Lawyer' About Ethical Questions" (1998) 27 Hofstra L. Rev. I at 4 [Thinking Like a Lawyer (1998)].
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[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in
all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and,
amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing
this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction
which he may bring upon others.'
The lawyer's role was conceptually and morally simple-facilitate
understanding of the available legal options and fearlessly protect the
client's interests even at the expense of harm to innocent third parties. By
using the law as the outer boundary of permissible conduct, the profession
could simultaneously claim that lawyers acted honourably and as officers
of the court.
It should be pointed out that some have suggested that this hired gun
ideology of lawyering is of more recent vintage having only emerged in the
1960s and 1970s in the United States and perhaps much later in Canada. 9
Indeed, we can find expressions of role morality throughout the first half
of the twentieth century in Canada, that appear to give more prominence
to personal conscience than in the post-1960 era. 2° However, this so-called
"golden age" of the profession may have simply engaged in a different
kind of unaccountable and zealous representation. Given the profession's
history of exclusion both in terms of entry and access to justice, 2' one is
left to question whether these calls for reliance on personal morality were
simply a means to further exclusion and maintain the dominance of the
privileged. As Wesley Pue has noted:

18. As quoted in R. v. Neil, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 631 at para. 12.
19. See e.g., the discussion in Ethics and CanadianCriminalLaw, supra note 11 at 3-5.
20. See e.g., W.B. Ferris, "The Call" (1949) 7 Advocate 137 at 140: "[n]o lawyer should allow
his retainer by a client to interfere with that he considers his public duties and to do that which his
conscience tells him he should do." See also the discussion in W. Wesley Pue, "Becoming 'Ethical':
Lawyers' Professional Ethics in Early Twentieth Century Canada" (1991) 20 Man. L.J. 227 at 239
[Becoming Ethical].
21. See generally, Constance Backhouse, "Gender and Race In The Construction of 'Legal
Professionalism': Historical Perspectives" (2003) online: Law Society of Upper Canada <http://www.
lsuc.on.ca/news/updates/define prof.jsp#colloquium> (date accessed: 28 February 2005) [Gender
and Race].
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We do not know exactly how or why a code of professional ethics
was first developed in Canada but we do know that it emerged from a
and generally aligned
professional culture which was xenophobic, elitist
2
with capital interests against ordinary citizens. 1
Leaving aside the exact moment in time when fearless allegiance to
the client's interests took root in our role morality, let me return to the
question posed earlier: does Brougham's speech still accurately capture
our role morality today? Given public discontent, academic criticisms of
the concept of role morality (discussed infra), and indeed the conduct of the
lawyers in the study referred to earlier, it would appear that most perceive
a lawyer in hired gun terms. This article argues that this perception is
mistaken and that, over the last fifteen years, we have been engaged in an
ongoing process of role morality reconstruction. Under this reconstructed
institutional role, an ethic of client-centred zealous advocacy has slowly
begun to be replaced with a justice-seeking ethic that seeks to give effect
to law's ambition.
Part I of this article provides the basic foundations of this reconstruction
thesis. The first section of Part I defines role morality and defends keeping
it as the beacon of ethical reflection rather than jettisoning it in favour of
an approach that relies on personal responsibility or morality as has been
argued by many academics including Allan Hutchinson, Alvin Esau, and
Donald Buckingham in Canada and David Luban in the United States.23
The next section attempts to trace the evolution of our understanding of
the public interest. As the legal profession has always attempted to ground
22. W. Wesley Pue, "In Pursuit of Better Myth: Lawyers' Histories and Histories of Lawyers"
(1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 730 at 762-763 [In Pursuitof Better Myth]. Consequently, it may have been
commonplace for lawyers in the first part of the twentieth century, for example, to refuse to vigorously
represent (or represent at all), an individual perceived to be (or constructed as) a threat to the existing
social, economic and political order and to rely on conscience or their own personal morality to
justify that decision. On the other hand, these very same lawyers likely had no difficulty applying
Brougham's exhortation for the wealthy client who wished, for example, to build a factory that would
cause harmful emissions for a neighbouring low-income housing community. For example, Pue writes
about a prominent lawyer in 1919 who, in a speech to members of the Canadian Bar Association about
the dangers of so-called "scheming for business", made it "abundantly clear that the real problem with
commercialized legal practice was that it permitted injured workers, the poor, maimed and injured, to

recover damages from business enterprises!" See Becoming Ethical, supra note 20 at 231-232, 245246.
23. See Allan C. Hutchinson, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility (Toronto: Irwin Law,
1999) [Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility]; Alvin A.J. Esau, "What Should We Teach?
Three Approaches to Professional Responsibility" in Donald E. Buckingham et al., eds., Legal Ethics
in Canada: Theory and Practice(Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996) 178-191; Donald E. Buckingham,
"Rules and Roles: Casting Off Legal Education's Moral Blinders For An Approach That Encourages
Moral Development" (1996) 9 Can. J.L. & Jur. Ill; Alice Woolley "Integrity in Zealousness:
Comparing the Standard Conception of the Canadian and American Lawyer" (1996) 9 Can. J.L. &
Jur. 61 [Integrity in Zealousness]; David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An EthicalStudy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988) [Lawyers and Justice].
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itself in the public interest, how the profession conceives of the public
interest will largely determine how it, and its members, should conduct
themselves. The final section of Part I attempts to provide the evidence
of this reconstructed role morality by exploring statements from leading
members of the profession, recent ethics jurisprudence, and finally,
by examining equality and harm prevention principles in our codes of
conduct. 4
Like any large and bureaucratic institution, the profession will
inevitably be slow to respond to its new identity and the changing set
of norms and values that go with that identity. Indeed, many parts of our
codes of conduct remain inconsistent with a justice-seeking ethic. To fully
give effect to legal practice as a means of securing justice rather than
maximizing clients' goals, there will need to be structural change, strong
leadership from the law societies and Canadian Bar Association, and a
reorientation in law schools. These issues are beyond the scope of the
paper. Part II does address, however, how lawyers can, on an individual
level, give effect to this evolving role morality by adopting a pervasive
justice-seeking ethic and engaging in identity lawyering that is consistent
with the interests of justice.
I. Role morality,public interest and ajustice-seekingethic
1. What is role morality?
Role morality is the set of norms, standards, and values that govern the
conduct of individuals when acting as lawyers. It is the profession's

24. The focus will be on Ontario, see Rules of ProfessionalConduct, online: Law Society of Upper
Canada <http://www.Isuc.on.ca/services/rulesprofcondpageen.jsp> (date accessed: 22 February
2005) [Ontario]and the Canadian Bar Association, Code of Conduct, online: Canadian BarAssociation
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/code/> (date accessed: 25 February 2005) [CBA] as they have
been very active in amending their codes.
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"professional conscience. '25 The foundations for role morality are not
religious, spiritual or even utilitarian principles of good and evil or right
and wrong. Instead, the foundations are largely normative involving roledifferentiated and specific requirements. These norms and values come from
expectations (i.e., what role should lawyers play in our society) and from
codes of conduct, jurisprudence, custom, and convention. The rationale
for recognizing a distinct way of thinking and acting for individuals
occupying the role of legal professional is perhaps best explained by many
of the codes of conduct which contain the following exhortation: "a lawyer
has special responsibilities by virtue of the privileges afforded the legal
profession and the important role it plays in a free and democratic society
'26
and in the administration ofjustice.....
Using role morality as an ethical guide for lawyers has been given
short shrift. For many, it is inappropriate because it gives effect to, and
further entrenches, the excesses of the adversarial process, namely,
zealous advocacy, partisanship and a "sporting theory ofjustice." It is thus
perceived to be a shield by which to protect lawyers from accountability
and, therefore, as "amoral" lawyering. 27 As an alternative to role morality,
we have seen the new ethics scholars like Luban and Hutchinson urge
lawyers to take personal responsibility for the decisions they make and to
rely on personal morality as their compass. 2' For example, in what he calls
his "ethical call to arms," Hutchinson exhorts:
25. See Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187; 1845 Pa. LEXIS 306 (1845) [Rush]. In Rush, the respondent,
a lawyer, was hired by the appellant to prosecute a third party for forgery. At that time, individuals
could retain lawyers to prosecute criminal cases. During the course of the prosecution, the lawyer
became convinced of the accused's innocence and dismissed the action against the wishes of his client.
After he collected his fee, the client called him a "thief, robber, and cheat." The lawyer launched an
action for slander. As his justification, the client argued that the lawyer was obligated to follow his
instructions. In rejecting this argument, Justice Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held (at
189):
It is a popular, but gross mistake, to suppose that a lawyer owes no fidelity to any one
except his client; and that the latter is the keeper of his professional conscience. He is
expressly bound by his official oath to behave himself in his office of attorney with all due
fidelity to the court as well as the client; and he violates it when he consciouslypressesfor
an unjustjudgment; much more so when he presses for the conviction of an innocent man
[emphasis added].
Rush has been largely ignored in professional responsibility and ethics discussions in the United
States. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, "Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics" (2005) 74
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1.
26. See Rule 1.03(l)(b), Ontario, supra note 24.
27. See e.g., the discussion in Randal N. Graham, "Moral Contexts" (2001) 50 U.N.B.L.J. 77 at 8387.
28. Luban, for example, offers the following circumstances which would be prohibited under his
moral activism approach: (1) the "inflict[ion] [of] morally unjustifiable damage on other people,
especially innocent people"; (2) "deceit"; (3) "manipulations of morally defensible law to achieve
outcomes that negate its generality or violate its spirit"; and (4) "the pursuit of substantively unjust
results." See Lawyers and Justice,supra note 23 at 157.
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a fully ethical practice requires an independent sense of moral virtue that
involves the lifelong development of personal moral character.... [I]t is
about the development of a moral way of living and lawyering ....
My most central recommendation is to urge lawyers to take personal
responsibility for what they say and do in their professional capacities....
It is for each person to arrive at an informed and conscientious decision
in accordance with his or her political and moral lights.2 9

Finally, many are critical of using role morality to foster ethical judgment
because it is assumed that "there is little space for reflection or engagement
[as] reference to the professional codes is intended to provide definitive
and authoritative answers." 3
My response to these criticisms is fourfold. First, the criticisms are
largely grounded in the traditional image of lawyer as the hired gun or
the "honest" hired gun and do not necessarily hold true if one accepts the
argument that we are in the midst of reconstructing role morality as the
pursuit ofjustice.al As Hutchinson himself recognizes "[t]he argument that
there is a strongly differentiated role morality that lawyers are to interpose
between their personal and professional lives can only be justified by
reference to the overall and deeper moral worth of the profession's work
generally."32 Second, while role morality may be amoral in the sense that it
relies on role differentiation and legal values rather than common morality
as its guide, the foundations of our legal system are largely built upon
values such as truth and justice. Indeed, controversial moral issues such
as abortion, same-sex marriage, or the exclusion of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence have escaped the will of the moral (and likely political)
majority because of the triumph of legal values such as dignity, equality,
and procedural fairness. And so while we can all debate whether the
statues outside the Supreme Court of Canada bearing the words "veritas"
and "justitia" are more about law's ambition than its practice, the ambition
is nevertheless a moral one and role morality demands that lawyers give
effect to that ambition in their conduct.
Third, asking lawyers to rely on their own morality is often too
subjectivist and relativist to ensure that justice is served on a consistent
29.

Legal Ethics and ProfessionalResponsibility, supra note 23 at 47-49, 195.

30.

Supra at note 23 at 39-40. Hutchinson is not alone in his criticism of using rules to promote

ethical reflection. See e.g., The Valentine s CardIn The OperatingRoom, supra note 6 at 865-873;

Margaret A. Wilkinson, Christa Walker & Peter Mercer, "Do Codes of Conduct Actually Shape Legal
Practice?" (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 645; Testing Theory, supra note 13 at 190. See also the discussion of

this issue in the context of the discrimination and sexual harassment rules in Joan Brockman, "The Use
of Self-Regulation To Curb Discrimination and Sexual Harassment In the Legal Profession" (1997) 35
Osgoode Hall L.J. 209 [The Use of Self-Regulation].
31.
This is defined infra.
32. Legal Ethics and ProfessionalResponsibility,supra note 24 at 10.
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basis. The attraction of a role differentiated guide to behaviour is that
lawyers are taught to "think like lawyers" which, in theory, empowers
them to determine what justice demands in any given situation.33 As
William Simon puts it:
[i]f the problem involves the reconciliation of competing legal values,
lawyers know how to address it. The range of solutions and authorities
and the modes of analysis and argument that lawyers habitually employ
in their everyday work are available and appropriate for the central issues
of legal ethics....
On the other hand, if the problem arises from claims of nonlegal values,
then lawyers are likely to be uncertain how to deal with these claims
collectively and individually. They have no common analytical and
rhetorical tools for addressing them. The tools offered in popular culture
for considering moral problems seem too formless and subjective; those
offered by academic philosophy seem too abstract and multifarious.34
This link between ethical reflection and thinking like a lawyer has also
been made by Christine Boyle and Marilyn MacCrimmon:
We say that to engage in legal reasoning is to be attentive to human rights,
in the broadest sense-that legally-trained people, that is those who
understand and are committed to the concept of the rule of law, reflect
the investment society makes in insurance against tyranny and injustice.
This can be expressed in terms, familiar to lawyers, of professional
responsibility. For example, the Law Society of British Columbia, in its
Canons of Legal Ethics, says that 'it is a lawyer's duty ... to serve the
cause of justice.' We take the view that the discipline of law requires
attention to the very values, in particular such values as human dignity
and equality, which form the basis of the criticism that individual laws
or legal practices fail to live up to those values. In that the very essence
of lawyering requires attention to such values it can be said that people
who are not so attentive are doing something that is perhaps legalistic
but not law. 5
Moreover, asking lawyers to rely on justice to guide their conduct should
also more easily enable them to defend behaviour that may be inconsistent
with prevailing professional or legal norms. Lawyers will be more
comfortable, given their training, to articulate a justice-based justification
should they have to account for their conduct. Discipline tribunals and
malpractice triers will be more receptive to justice-based as opposed to

33. See generally William H. Simon, "Thinking Like a Lawyer-About Ethics" (1999-2000) 38
Duq. L. Rev. 1015 [ThinkingLike.A Lawyer (1999-2000)].
34. The PracticeOfJustice, supra note 2 at 18.
35. Christine Boyle & Marilyn MacCrimmon, "To Serve the Cause of Justice: Disciplining Fact
Determination" (2001) 20 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 55 at 59.
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conscience-based defences. In addition, clients are more likely to listen
and act when the dialogue concerns what justice demands in the situation
as opposed to what the lawyer's moral compass will permit.
Finally, role morality is not solely about adhering to a rigid set of
positivist rules or legal commands as has been suggested. Rather, it is
about professional identity and a state of mind. It is not about asking each
lawyer the question "what kind of a lawyer do I want to be" but rather,
"what kind of a lawyer does the legal profession demand I be." In order
to answer this question, each lawyer must ask herself what the substantive
norms inherent in law demand in the particular situation, taking into
account the purpose behind the legal command and the context in which it
is operating. A reconstructed role morality requires considerable reflection
and contextual thinking. It is about developing and actualizing a "sense"
36

of justice.

And so, while I agree with Hutchinson's call for lawyers to take
responsibility for their actions, I part company in terms of what exactly
lawyers are to take responsibility for. Under a reconstructed role morality,
lawyers are required to take professionalresponsibility to ensure that their
conduct promotes the cause of justice. Again, as we frequently see stated
in codes of conduct, "[a] lawyer's responsibilities are greater than those
of a private citizen."37 That said, it is clear that we agree on what we see
as the goal of legal ethics. As Hutchinson puts it "it is incumbent on the
profession to ensure that the interests of justice are placed squarely and
regularly at the forefront of professional concerns."38 This is the very
essence of law's ambition.
2. The professionalobligation of lawyers to act "in the public interest"
As it has been argued that role morality is largely normative and its
content is derived from thinking about the role lawyers should play in
our society, it is now necessary to address the parameters of that role. It
is beyond dispute that serving the interests of the public is the prevailing

36. The concept of a "sense" of justice can be found throughout moral and political theory. For a
summary, see Markus Dirk Dubber, "Making Sense of the Sense of Justice" (2005) 53 Buff. L. Rev.
815.
37. See e.g., the Commentary to Rule 4.06(1) Ontario,supra note 24. Moreover, as David Wilkins
has observed:
Lawyers are more than ordinary citizens; they have been given a monopoly by the state to
occupy a position of trust both with respect to the interests of their clients and the public
purposes of the legal framework. As a result, the kind of deliberation that may be appropriate
in the realm of personal moral decision making will not always produce the social goods
that society legitimately expects from a regime of professional ethics.
See "In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have A Prima Facie Duty To Obey The
Law" (1996-1997) 38 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 269 at 274 [In Defense of Law and Morality].
38. Legal Ethics andProfessionalResponsibility, supra note 23 at 10.
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ideology and guiding principle of the profession.3 9 The idea that Canadian
lawyers are obligated to act in the "public interest" finds its most emphatic
expression in the jurisprudential recognition of the utility of the selfregulating nature of the legal profession and in legislation that establishes
the right of law societies to regulate.40 So, for example, in Pearlmanv.
Manitoba Law Society Judicial Committee, the Supreme Court held that
"the self-governing status of the professions, and of the legal profession
in particular, was created in the public interest."' 4 1 Similarly, the preface to
the Canadian Bar Association Code of Conduct states that:
The Code of Professional Conduct that follows is to be understood
and applied in the light of its primary concern for the protection of the
public interest. This principle is implicit in the legislative grants of selfgovernment.... Inevitably, the practical application of the Code to the
diverse situations that confront an active profession in a changing society
will reveal gaps, ambiguities and apparent inconsistencies. In such cases,
the principles of protection of the public interest will serve to guide the
practitioner to the 42applicable principles of ethical conduct and the true
intent of the Code.
3. Our evolving understandingof what is "in the public interest"
As noted earlier, the ideology of lawyering in this country has historically
been, generally speaking, one of client-centred zealousness. Its expression
can be seen in Justice George Finlayson's address to the 1980 call to the
bar ceremony in Ontario:
We must have the ability to sit back and view a client's problems
dispassionately and be able to advise as to what would be in his or her
best interests.... [The lawyer] is representing a person, and that person
is entitled to be told what his circumstance is, not what he or you, his
lawyer, would like it to be.
[o]ur duty is not to motivate the clients or to involve them in our concerns,
but to deal with the problem of a particular client and to obtain the best
possible result in representing the client, keeping in mind the client and
nobody else.
[s]o long as you choose to practice law in the traditional sense-the
representation of a client in any sphere-you must neverforget thatyour
duty is to that client alone....

39. See Frederick DeCoste, "Towards A Comprehensive Theory of Professional Responsibility"
(2001) 50 U.N.B.L.J. 109 at 117.
40. See e.g., The Legal Profession Act (British Columbia), S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, s. 3(a).
41. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 869 at 887 (as per lacobucci J.).
42. CBA, supranote 24. With some modifications, the CBA Code of Conduct is used by law societies
in Saskatchewn, Manitoba, Newfoundland, P.E.I.,
Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut.
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If you confuse your social or politicalconscience with your duty to that
client, you betray his trust;you betray us all.43

It is curious how this ideology grew out of a profession that has defined
itself in the public interest. Why were we (and why are we still in many
respects) so willing to say to the client, "I am prepared to do your bidding
whatever it may be and regardless of the harm that may accrue provided
you can stay within the narrow bounds of the law"? It is far too simplistic
to think that this ideology can be explained in terms of pure self-interest.
Surely we have had to weave a far more complex myth to convince
generations of well-meaning individuals to buy into this traditional role
morality.
What is this myth? It would appear that the public interest justifications
for this ideology of lawyering include the long-term promotion of access
to justice, competent representation, and client autonomy." The link to
access is explained as follows. If lawyers are seen to be moral advisors
to their client, then a lawyer who represents an unpopular or repugnant
client will be viewed as endorsing the client's position. Role morality,
therefore, protects the lawyer from being vilified in public. We recently
saw an example of this when Stockwell Day suggested that a lawyer who
defended an individual charged with possession of child pornography was
personally in favour of child pornography. 5 As for competence, client
loyalty manifested in strict confidentiality rules ensures, in theory, that
there will not be a chilling effect on communication and a free flow of

43. LawyerAs A Professional,supra note 16 at 230, 235 [emphasis added].
44. See generally Monroe H. Freedman "How Lawyers Act In The Interests Of Justice" (2002)
70 Fordham L. Rev. 1717; Stephen L. Pepper, "The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A
Problem, and Some Possibilities" (1986), 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613.
45. See "The Letter That Launched The Lome Goddard Lawsuit" The Edmonton Journal(18 January
2001) A2.
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information which is necessary for competent representation.46 This
chilling effect is seen to impact not only the quality of representation
but also access. Individuals with problems may fear seeking legal help
if they think that their lawyer will disclose their confidences. Moreover,
some have argued that strict rules of confidentiality may, in fact, serve to
protect the public from future harm. If clients feel that they can alert their
lawyer as to their intentions, the lawyer may be in a position to dissuade
them from so acting. In addition to these justifications, there has been the
steadfast belief that the negative effects of zealousness will be checked by
the adversarial nature of the adjudicative process. In theory, each side of a
dispute is represented by competent counsel and a neutral umpire ensures
47
that truth and justice are served.
The problem with these justifications, however, is that they are
largely illusory and without foundation. For example, the idea that
criminal and civil disputes are resolved by means of an adversarial trial
is largely a myth. 8 Most cases are settled well before trial either by
way of settlement, mediation, or a guilty plea. For example, in criminal
cases, where adversarialism is purportedly most vibrant, it is estimated

46. As Justice Sopinka, for the majority, observed in Macdonald Estate v. Martin, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
1235 at 1244 [MacdonaldEstate]:
The legal profession has distinguished itself from other professions by the sanctity with
which ... communications [between a lawyer and client] are treated. The law, too, perhaps
unduly, has protected solicitor and client exchanges while denying the same protection to
others. This tradition assumes particular importance when a client bares his or her soul in
civil or criminal litigation. Clients do this in the justifiable belief that nothing they say will
be used against them and to the advantage of the adversary. Loss of this confidence would
deliver a serious blow to the integrity of the profession and to the public's confidence in
the administration ofjustice.
Similarly, in Smith v. Jones (1999), 132 C.C.C. (3d) 225 at 240 (S.C.C.) [Smith v. Jones],Justice Cory,
for the majority, held:
Family secrets, company secrets, personal foibles and indiscretions all must on occasion
be revealed to the lawyer by the client. Without this privilege clients could never be candid
and furnish all the relevant information that must be provided to lawyers if they are to
properly advise their clients.
See also the discussion in City of Montreal v. Foster Wheeler Power Co., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 456 at 475476.
47. As was observed in R. v. Joanisse (1995), 102 C.C.C. (3d) 35 at 57 (Ont. C.A.) [Joanisse], "[w]e
place our trust in the adversarial process to determine the truth of criminal allegations. The adversarial
process operates on the premise that the truth of a criminal allegation is best determined by 'partisan
advocacy on both sides of the case'...."
48. See the discussion of this myth in Gavin MacKenzie, "Breaking the Dichotomy Habit: The
Adversary System and the Ethics of Professionalism" (1995) 29 Gazette 122 at 132-140.
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that over ninety per cent of cases are resolved before trial. 49 And, even
when criminal cases go to trial, many individuals are unrepresented. A
2002 Department of Justice funded study discovered shockingly high
levels of unrepresentation in nine provincial court sites across Canada.50
Other accused are under-represented either because of inadequate legal
aid funding, over-reliance on over-worked duty counsel,51 or incompetent
representation. 2 For example, in one troubling Ontario case, a defence
lawyer in Toronto candidly revealed that he did not "do jails" in response
to a claim on appeal that he was ineffective because he did not interview
his client, a young offender in custody, before the trial date.53
Returning to the justifications for zealousness, while autonomy is an
important goal that the law seeks to enhance, no one has the right to harm
another under the guise of self-realization. 4 Indeed, one of the central
purposes of a legal system is to constrain autonomous action in the name
of collective peace and security. And finally, there is no evidence that
zealousness manifested in the strict maintenance of confidences has served
to create greater access, promote competence or a just system. As Simon
has pointed out, there is simply no evidence that the confidentiality rule
has served to promote trust and a free exchange of information between
the client and lawyer.5 Nor is there any evidence that transactional
49. This includes guilty pleas and withdrawal of charges by the Crown. See Milica P. Piccinato,
"Plea Bargaining" The International Corporation Group, online: Department of Justice <http://canada.
justice.gc.ca/en/ps/inter/plea2.html> documenting a 1998 study in Ontario. See also the discussion in
Joseph Di Luca, "Expedient McJustice or Principled Alternative Dispute Resolution? A Review of
Plea Bargaining in Canada" (2005) 50 Crim. L.Q. 14 at 15. As DiLuca observes, "[w]e now operate in
a system of guilty plea justice."
50. See Robert G. Hann, Joan Nuffield, Colin Meredith & Mira Svoboda, "Court Site Study of
Adult Unrepresented Accused in the Provincial Criminal Courts Part 1: Overview Report" (September
2002), online: Department of Justice <http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/rs/rep/rr03-LARS-2.pdf>. For
example, the authors provide the following general summary of their findings:
[i]n some situations, depending on the jurisdiction and the stage at which plea was
entered, well in excess of 50 percent of accused are convicted without the benefit of
legal representation.
[iun some situations, depending on the jurisdiction and the type of offence, up to 30
percent of those convicted receive custodial sentences, again without benefit of legal
representation.
51. Ibid.
52. See David M. Tanovich, "Charting The Constitutional Right of Effective Assistance of Counsel
in Canada" (1994) 36 Crim. L.Q. 404; "Further Developments On Claims of Ineffectiveness of
Counsel" (1995) 34 C.R. 32.
53. He also failed to interview a defence witness until the day of the trial. See R. v. B. (L. C.) (1996),
104 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (Ont. C.A.). The Court of Appeal ultimately concluded that this conduct did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
54. See generally, David Luban, "Partisanship, Betrayal And Autonomy In The Lawyer-Client
Relationship: A Reply To Stephen Ellmann" (1990) 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1004 at 1035-1043 [Partisanship,
Betrayal andAutonomy].
55. The Practice of Justice, supra note 2 at 54-62. See also Fred Zacharias, "Rethinking
Confidentiality" (1989) 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351 at 377-96.
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lawyering requires the same level of confidentiality as litigation and yet
the rule has applied with equal vigour in both contexts.16 It is troubling
that our system has been built on assumptions about confidentiality that
have never been empirically tested. The recognition of the illusory nature
of these justifications along with the realization of the harm and injustice
caused by zealousness has played an important role in our rethinking of
what lawyering "in the public interest" means.
There are a number of other factors that have emerged over the last
fifteen years as well. The first and perhaps most important factor was the
introduction of the Charterin 1982 and, in particular, section 15(1) and
its guarantee of substantive equality. This equality guarantee has provided
us with a powerful measuring stick that can be (and has been) used as
a guiding principle by which to assess the impact of our behaviour as
lawyers on clients, our colleagues, and other members of the public." In
conjunction with section 15(1), we have seen greater participation in the
profession by traditionally excluded groups, particularly women, and this
has had an impact on how we think about ethics and professionalism. As
Rosemary Cairns Way notes:
The Honourable Bertha Wilson, in her capacity as chair of the Canadian
Bar Association (C.B.A.) Task Force on Gender Inequality in the Legal
Profession suggested that the influx of women had triggered a rethinking
of the meaning of professionalism. For her, professionalism encompassed
more than service to the client, it required a commitment to justice, and
specifically to equality. 8
Moreover, the last decade has seen a more diverse and representative
group of individuals who are ultimately responsible for governance and
the development of the codes of conduct.5 9 We are also slowly beginning
to recognize and give effect to a distinct legal culture in Canada which
includes an Aboriginal legal tradition. 60 And finally, the recent recognition
of the importance of pro bono work and the willingness of the Supreme
56. For a compelling argument on why the confidentiality rule should not apply with the same vigour
in corporate law, see "Corporate Counsel and Confidentiality" (Chapter 10) in Lawyers and Justice,
supra note 24.
57. See generally Rosemary Cairns Way, "Reconceptualizing Professional Responsibility:
Incorporating Equality" (2002) 25 Dal. L.J. 27 ["Reconceptualizing Professional Responsibility"].
58. Ibid. at 32.
59. In Ontario, for example, some of these benchers are (and have included) Professor Constance
Backhouse, Professor Joanne St. Louis who is African-Canadian, Mary Eberts, Tracey O'Donnell and
Todd Ducharme both of whom are Aboriginal, Avvy Yao-Yao Go who is Asian, Beth Symes, Carol
Curtis, Eleanour Cronk, and Vern Krishna who is South Asian.
60. We can see this influence, for example, in our thinking about restorative justice. In the context
of sentencing, see R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688. See also Larry Chartrand, "The Appropriateness
Of The Lawyer As Advocate In Contemporary Aboriginal Justice Initiatives" (1994-1995) 33 Alta. L.
Rev. 874.
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Court to impose limits on the ability of lawyers to do harm has heightened
our understanding of the importance of the relationship between lawyers
and the public.61
What then is our current understanding of the obligation of lawyers to
act "in the public interest"? I suggest that we have been moving towards a
conception of public interest that requires lawyers to act in the pursuit of
justice. Justice can be defined, for the purposes of the lawyering process, as
the correct resolution of legal disputes or problems in afair,responsible,
and non-discriminatory manner.62 This approach to justice has both
procedural and substantive elements. The procedural component is the
right to a fair and non-discriminatory process that is capable of producing
the result demanded by the law. The substantive component involves
assessing the merit of the legal claim as seen through the lens of the law
properly interpreted. A proper interpretation is one that gives effect to the
purpose behind the legal provision and which ensures that the provision
is consistent with other substantive legal norms such as equality, fairness,
and harm reduction. It is also one that pays special attention to our history
of injustice. 63 Having defined justice in this fashion, the pursuit of justice
requires the following minimum ethical obligations of lawyers:
* Do what you reasonably can to promote accessibility to legal
representation64;
* Ensure that your competence extends beyond legal skills and
knowledge to cultural sensitivity and understanding (i.e., cultural
competence) 65 ;
61. See in particular, R. v. Lyttle (2004), 180 C.C.C. (3d) 476 (S.C.C.) (prohibiting the putting of false
suggestions to a witness on cross-examination) [Lyttle]; Smith v. Jones, supranote 46 (recognizing an
exception to confidentiality/privilege to prevent future harm).
62. This is consistent with Simon's approach to both ethical reflection and the meaning of justice.
As he writes, "[l]awyers should take those actions that, considering the relative circumstances of the
particular case, seem likely to promote justice." Simon defines justice as the "'legal merits' of the
matter at hand." See The Practiceof Justice, supra note 2 at 10, 138.
63. See Alan Dershowitz, Rights From Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights (New
York: Basic Books, 2004) at 8-9.
64. See Breach of Contract, supra note 4 at 351 on the issue of mandatory pro bono obligations for
lawyers. As for imposing a similar obligation on law professors and students, see Deborah L. Rhode,
"The Professional Responsibilities of Professors" (2001) 51 J. Legal Educ. 158 at 162-164; Deborah
L. Rhode, "The Professional Responsibilities of Professional Schools" (1999) 49 J. Legal Educ. 24
at 30-36; Deborah L. Rhode, "Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students"
(1999) 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2415 at 2416-2417.
65. See Advancing The Justice Ethic, supra note 7. See also, Susan Bryant, "The Five Habits:
Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers" (2001) 8 Clinical L. Rev. 33; Michelle S. Jacobs,
"People From The Footnotes: The Missing Element In Client-Centered Counseling" (1997) 27 Golden
Gate U. L. Rev. 345; Carwina Weng, "Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching Psychology to Develop
Cultural Self-Awareness" (2005) 11Clinical L. Rev. 401; and, Carolyn C. Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci,
"Practicing Culturally Competent Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Collaboration between Social Work
and Law" (2004) 14 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol'y 133.
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* Protect your client's right to a fair process and a result which is
consistent with the legal merit of the claim;
* Generally avoid deceitful, obstructionist, or other conduct that will
frustrate the ability of the process to produce the legally correct
result;

* Do not engage in conduct that will have a discriminatory impact on
third parties66 ;

* Protect your client's right to be free from discriminatory practices or
conduct; and,
* Be responsible. Avoid and disclose conduct that will unjustifiably
harm an innocent third party.67

Some may view this concept of a justice-seeking ethic as one of client
betrayal as it will sometimes require the lawyer to refuse to follow the
client's instructions, disclose confidential information to prevent harm,
or assist an unrepresented litigant. However, as Simon notes, "[a] lawyer
who limits the distance she will go for a client on the basis of norms of
legal merit or justice does not deprive the client of anything he is entitled
to; on the contrary, she simply insists on respecting the entitlements of
others."6 8 In many respects, this is no different than the limit on the zealous
advocate to act within the bounds of the law. Ajustice-seeking ethic simply
demands that lawyers engage in a reorientation of what the law demands
in individual cases.
Nevertheless, one of the biggest challenges in actualizing this ethic will
be for lawyers to learn how to deal with situations where their client will
feel that they are being betrayed. There is no question that many lawyers
will feel uncomfortable with having justice-based dialogues with those who
are paying their fees. How would you explain to the client, for example,
that their conduct is not prohibited under the law as currently interpreted
by the courts, but that it is contrary to the law properly interpreted by
you? This is not to say that a justice-seeking ethic will necessarily lead to
a "race to the bottom" where the client will end the retainer and find their
"hired gun" at another firm. As has been suggested:

66. In many respects, this conception of a justice-seeking ethic mirrors Rosemary Cairns Way's
equality-seeking ethic. See Reconceptualizing ProfessionalResponsibility, supra note 57 at 46. See
also the discussion in Esmeralda M.A. Thornhill, "Ethics in the Legal Profession: The Issue ofAccess"
(1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 810.
67. The exhortation to act responsibly and do no harm are integral to Richard Devlin's reconstruction
of legal ethics. See "Normative and Somewhere To Go? Reflections On Professional Responsibility"
(1994-1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 924 at 933 [Normative and Somewhere To Go].
68. The Practiceof Justice, supra note 2 at 50.
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Clients might value high ethical standards in lawyers because they
themselves have such standards and prefer to associate with people who
share their views. They may value such high standards because they
believe such standards are associated with an especially sophisticated
type of legal judgment that is less likely to sacrifice the client's long-term
interests to short-term gain. They may value them because association
with lawyers with a reputation for high standards lends the client
valuable69 status or credibility with third parties with whom the client has
to deal.

Even more challenging may be explaining your conduct to your firm. In
other words, institutional forces will pose challenges for those committed
to this style of discretionary lawyering. 70 It will, therefore, be important
for the Canadian Bar Association and provincial law societies to play an
active role in supporting lawyers committed to pursuing a justice-seeking
ethic. This support can come in providing advice, setting standards and in
intervening when a lawyer fears negative consequences from their firm. 71It
will also be important for law schools to instill an ethic of justice in future
lawyers. There is great strength in numbers. Richard Devlin reminds us of
one powerful American example of the ability of transformative lawyering
to occur despite the so-called bottom line. In the 1980s, an 61ite Washington
law firm (Covington & Burley) severed its retainer with an airline owned
by the South African government after a student-led boycott.72
Having set out what I suggest is our evolving understanding of acting
"in the public interest" (i.e., in the interests of justice) and offering an
explanation for why it is occurring, I end this section by marshalling
the support for my thesis. I suggest that this reconstruction of our "role
morality" can be seen in professional statements, jurisprudence, and in
equality and harm reduction principles in our codes of conduct.

69. See Robert Gordon & William H. Simon, "The Redemption of Professionalism" in Robert Nelson
et. al., eds., Lawyers'Ideals/Lawyers'Practices:Transformations in the American Legal Profession
(Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1992) 230 at 245.
70. See a discussion of these issues in Dead Parrot,supra note 6 and Tanina Rostain, "Waking Up
From Uneasy Dreams: Professional Context, Discretionary Judgment and The Practice of Justice"
(1999) 51 Stan. L. Rev. 955.
71. Devlin offers some important insights into these issues in Normative and Somewhere To Go,
supra note 67 at 940-941. See also Simon's response to a number of these issues in "The Legal and the
Ethical in Legal Ethics: A Brief Rejoinder to Comments on The Practiceof Justice" (1999) 51 Stan.
L. Rev. 991.
72. Normative and Somewhere To Go, supra note 67 at 938. See also the discussion in William H.
Simon, "Ethical Discretion In Lawyering" (1988) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083 at 1130.
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4. The evidence of reconstruction
a. Professionalandjurisprudentialdevelopments
In Ontario, the most important professional statement of this reconstructed
role morality is the 1994 role statement of the Law Society of Upper
Canada (LSUC). For the first time, we see an explicit link between the
public interest and the pursuit of justice:
The Law Society of Upper Canada exists to govern the legal profession
in the public interest by
• ensuring that the people of Ontario are served by lawyers who meet
high standards of learning, competence and professional conduct,
and
• upholding the independence, integrity and honour of the legal
profession,

for the purpose of advancing the cause ofjustice and the rule of law.73
This statement was endorsed by Justice Abella in her 1999 address to the
Law Society Benchers. As she put it:
[t]here are three basic values which merge in a good lawyer: a commitment
to competence, which is about skills; a commitment to ethics, which is
about decency; and a commitment to professionalism, which transfuses
the public interest into the other two values....
To me, the Law Society got it right when it said in its 1994 Role Statement
that the legal profession exists74in the public interest to advance the cause
of justice and the rule of law.
In a later paper, Justice Abella stated that the essence of professionalism
was "whether justice is seen as being done."75 Chief Justice McMurtry of
the Ontario Court of Appeal has also recently observed:
I believe that in a changing world, the one thing that cannot change is our
common pursuit of justice. That is and must remain the principal reason
for the existence of the courts and the profession alike. They are bound

73. Adopted by Convocation, October 27, 1994 [emphasis added], see online: Law Society of Upper
Canada <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/conv/may2OOO/StrategicPlan.PDF> at 6. There was apparently some
resistence to this role statement because of its focus on protecting the public interest as opposed to
the interest of lawyers. See Carole Curtis, "Alternative Visions Of The Legal Profession In Society: A
Perspective On Ontario" (1994-1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 787 at 789.
74. Professionalism Revisited, supra note 9. See also Rosalie S. Abella, "Law, Literature, and
Identity: Seeking Equality" (2000) 63 Sask. L. Rev. 1.
75. "Professionalism in the Justice System: The Divine Comedy of Roscoe Pound" (2002) 51
U.N.B.L.J. 3 at 5.
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together by that pursuit.7 6

Similar sentiments have been echoed in Supreme Court of Canada
jurisprudence. In Smith v. Jones, the Court recognized that in some cases
the public interest will trump solicitor-client privilege and adopted a
broad future harm exception that the Court recognized would apply to "all
classifications of privileges and duties of confidentiality."77 In establishing
the contours of the exception, the Court did not limit the trigger of the harm
to criminal activity as was the traditional approach to future harm. Rather
it extended the exception to any act that poses a risk of death or serious
bodily harm including psychological harm that substantially interferes
with the health or well-being of the innocent third party.78
Five years later, in Lyttle, the Supreme Court added its voice to a longstanding legal and ethical debate about whether a lawyer can cross-examine
a truthful witness in order to create a misleading impression that the witness
is either lying or mistaken. 9 The issue has been a classic example of the
struggle in legal ethics between duty to the client, particularly in criminal
cases, the prohibition on misleading the court, and protecting the public
from harm. In this context, harm includes embarrassment and possibly
trauma for the witness. Justices Major and Fish, for the Court, held:
we believe that a question can be put to a witness in cross-examination
regarding matters that need not be proved independently, provided that
counsel has a goodfaith basisfor putting the question.
In this context, a "good faith basis" is a function of the information
available to the cross-examiner, and his or her belief in its likely
accuracy....
In fact, the information may be incomplete or uncertain,provided the
cross-examinerdoes not put suggestions to the witness recklessly or that
he or she knows to be false...
The purpose of the question must be consistent with the lawyer's role as
an officer of the court: to suggest what counsel genuinely thinks possible
on known facts or reasonable assumptions is in our view permissible; to
76. Online: Ontario Courts <http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/court of appeal/speeches/opening_
speeches/coareport 1999.htm>.
77. Smith v. Jones, supra note 46 at 239 (para. 44). This is discussed infra in relation to the Ontario
future harm exception.
78. Smith v. Jones, supra note 46 at 247-251.
79. See the discussion in The Criminal Defence Lawyer's Role, supra note 16 at 389-391; Legal
Ethics and ProfessionalResponsibility, supra note 23 at 154, 156; "Cross-Examining The Truthful
Witness" in Ethics and Canadian CriminalLaw, supra note II at 59-65 where the authors suggest that
such conduct is not necessarily ethical improper. See also Lawyers and Ethics, supra note 16 at 7.4.
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assert or to imply in a manner that is calculatedto mislead is in our view
improperand prohibited.°
Lyttle stands as one of the first cases where the Court infused a legal rule
with ethical principles.
b. Codes of conduct
Codes of conduct are "intended to express to the profession and to the
public the high ethical ideals of the legal profession"'" and thus are a good
place to find the minimum standards of conduct and aspirations of the
profession.8 2 However, even in relation to minimum standards, the codes of

conduct across this country are not consistent. This is hard to understand.
Questions, for example, of harm prevention, discrimination, sexual
harassment, the duty to report or the duty to rectify harm are not economic
in nature and thus bear no relationship to geography or demographics. One
can readily understand how the rules governing advertising or conflict of
interest may be different in P.E.I. as compared to Ontario. But what can
logically explain, for example, a more explicit expansive duty to prevent
future harm in Ontario than say in British Columbia?83 There is simply no
principled justification.
Consequently, I would argue that a lawyer should be entitled to rely on
any rule of professional conduct in Canada including the CBA Code when
deciding whether a justice-seeking course of conduct is or is not permitted.
80. Lyttle, supra note 61 at paras. 43, 44, 47, 48 [emphasis added]. Some are likely to argue that
Lyttle is not a complete answer to the ethical dilemma of cross-examining a truthful witness because
the issue in the case involved the putting of false suggestions to a witness. See, for example, the
Role, supra note 16 at 391-392. In some cases, truthful
discussion in The CriminalDefence Lawyer "s
witnesses will be challenged with suggestions grounded in truthful facts such as a prior criminal
record, prior inconsistent statement or evidence capable of constituting animus or some other motive
to lie. However, the language in Lyttle does appear broad enough to support an assertion that counsel
are prohibited from using cross-examination, even on truthful facts, in order to create a misleading
impression. I will return to this issue again in the discussion of the cross-examination of sexual assault
complainants and police officers in racial profiling cases.
81. Rule 1.03(d), Ontario,supra note 24.
82. As Justice Sopinka noted in Macdonald Estate, supra note 46 at 1244:
[a]n important statement of public policy with respect to the conduct of barrister and solicitor
is contained in the professional ethics codes of the governing bodies of the profession....
these rules must be taken as expressing the collective views of the profession as to the
appropriate standards to which the profession should adhere....
A code of professional conduct is designed to serve as a guide to lawyers....
83. In British Columbia, future harm is restricted to criminal acts involving death or serious bodily
harm. See Professional Conduct Handbook, "Confidential Information," Chapter 5 (Rule 13), online:
Law Society of British Columbia <http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/publications forms/handbook/body
_handbooktoc.html> [British Columbia]. In Ontario, future harm is linked to death, serious bodily
harm and psychological harm regardless of the cause of the harm. See Rule 2.03(3), Ontario, supra
note 24. This rule is discussed in more detail infra as well as my position that the scope of the future
harm rule recognized in Smith v. Jones and codified in Ontariowould now qualify under the "otherwise
provided by law" exception to confidentiality.
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I take this position notwithstanding the fact that some codes, like that in
New Brunswick, specifically address the situation and state that "[s]ave as
may be provided by law, in the event of a conflict of standards in matters
involving the conduct of the lawyer the standards declared by this Code
shall govern." 84 While breaching the rules is prima facie a disciplinary
infraction, there is a further requirement that the lawyer's conduct "bring
discredit upon the legal profession ... -"85 It is hard to imagine that this
latter standard would be met where a lawyer relied on a rule from another
province, for example, that served to protect an innocent third party from
serious bodily harm.
Other times, however, relying on the standards of another jurisdiction
will not involve an explicit breach of the rules in the lawyer's jurisdiction.
Since the rules are minimum standards, they will often be silent on the
issue confronting the lawyer. For example, there is very little guidance
on what a lawyer should do after discovering that a client has committed
perjury.86 In Alberta, a lawyer must make some attempt at rectification
unless it would involve revealing a confidence. The rules suggest, for
example, that the lawyer could advise the trier of fact not to rely on that
part of the testimony the lawyer knows to be false.87 Presumably, Alberta
is satisfied that this option does not, in theory, constitute a disclosure of
confidential information. Based on this reasoning and precedent, there
would be nothing to stop lawyers in provinces that are silent on the issue
to adopt this course of action, and to use it in their attempts to dissuade the
client from committing perjury.
In our codes of conduct, we can find powerful statements regarding
equality and harm reduction that reveal the reconstruction I have been
discussing. My point here is not to suggest that the codes have fully
embraced this reconstructed role morality. One can still find exhortations

84. See "Application and Interpretation" at 7, online: Law Society of New Brunswick <http://www.
lawsociety-barreau.nb.ca/emain.asp? 165> [New Brunswick].
85. See "Professional Misconduct", Rule 1.02, Ontario, supra note 24.
86. See Ethics and CanadianCriminalLaw, supra note 11, Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion of the
perjury dilemma.
87. See "The Lawyer as Advocate", Chapter 10 (Rule 15), online: Law Society of Alberta <http://
www.lawsocietyalberta.com/resources/codeProfConduct.cfm> [Alberta].
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consistent with the zealous advocate conception88 and, as noted above, the
codes are not consistent across the country. Instead, this discussion is meant
to demonstrate that our role morality is under construction and moving
towards a justice-seeking set of norms and, perhaps more importantly, to
empower lawyers by providing them with the sources they can rely on
to justify their conduct to themselves, their clients, their colleagues and
ultimately the law society should the need arise.
Promotingequality
All lawyers in Canada are now subject to code-based ethical obligations
not to discriminate. In Nova Scotia, for example, Rule 24 of the Legal
Ethics and Professional Conduct Handbook includes a note that states
that lawyers have an ethical obligation to "become familiar with and
understand section 15 of the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms"
and that a "lawyer should cultivate a knowledge and understanding of
Canadian jurisprudence on the meaning of equality and discrimination and
on adverse impact analysis... .'89 In Ontario, the interpretation rule (rule
1.03(1)(b)) specifically requires that the rules (and ultimately all conduct
of lawyers) be interpreted in a manner that "recognize[s] ...
the diversity
of the Ontario community ...
and [that] respect[s] human rights laws in
force in Ontario." In addition to this anti-discrimination interpretative aid,
rule 5.04(1) demands that lawyers not engage in conduct that discriminates

88. See e.g., the Commentary 2(h) to Chapter 1, "Integrity" (CBA) which asks lawyers to be
absolutely frank in their dealings with the tribunal, fellow lawyers and other parties "subject always to
not betraying the client's cause ....
"See online: Canadian Bar Association <http://www.cba.org/CBA/
resolutions/pdf/04-01-A.pdf>. Another example is the duty of advocates to fearlessly ...
ask every
question, however distasteful, which they think will help their client's case. See e.g., Rule 4.01(1),
Ontario, supra note 24 and Chapter IX, CBA, supra note 24 Interestingly, New Brunswick has
removed "distasteful" from the rule and have added a reasonableness requirement. The rule reads"...
the lawyer shall ask every question, raise every issue and advance every argument that the lawyer
thinks reasonably will assist the cause of the client...."
See Rule (b), Chapter 8, New Brunswick, supra
note 84.
89. Online: Nova Scotia Barristers' Society <http://www.nsbs.org/legalethics/chapter24.htm>.
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against anyone the lawyer interacts with in their professional capacity.9°
Rules 5.04(2) and (3) extend the rule to the provision of services and
employment practices. 91The commentaries to rules 5.04(1) and (3) clearly
define discrimination so as to make it clear that the rule is directed not
only at intentional discrimination but also systemic or adverse effects
discrimination (i.e., substantive equality):
An action or policy that is not intended to be discriminatory can result in
an adverse effect that is discriminatory. If the application of a seemingly
'neutral' rule or policy creates an adverse effect on a group protected by
rule 5.04, there is a duty to accommodate.
An employer should consider the effect of seemingly 'neutral' rules.
Some rules, while applied to everyone, can bar entry to the firm or pose
additional hardships on employees ...
The Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that what is required is
equality of result, not just of form. Differentiation can result in inequality,
but so too can the application of the same rule to everyone, without
regard for personal characteristics and circumstances. Equality of result
requires the accommodation of differences that arise from the personal

Ontario, supra note 24. Rule 5.04 came into force 1November 2000. 5.04(l) reads:
A lawyer has a special responsibility to respect the requirements of human rights laws
in force in Ontario and, specifically, to honour the obligation not to discriminate on the
grounds of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex,
sexual orientation, age, record of offences (as defined in the Ontario Human Rights Code),
marital status, family status, or disability with respect to professional employment of
other lawyers, articled students, or any other person or in professional dealings with other
members of the profession or any other person.
Rule 5.04 was preceded by Rule 28 which came into effect in September 1994. It tracked the wording
of Rule 5.04(1) although the commentary to Rule 5.04(1) is far more extensive and places obligations
on the lawyer that did not exist under Rule 28. This is discussed infra. Rule 28 was preceded by Rule
13, Commentary 5 which came into effect in January, 1990. Commentary 5 read:
The lawyer shall not discriminate on the grounds of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour,
ethnic origin, citizenship, religion, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, family
status, or handicap in the employment of other lawyers or articled students, or in dealings
with other members of the profession or any other persons.
From 1974 -1990, there was an even more limited discrimination rule that read:
The lawyer shall not discriminate on the grounds of [enumerated grounds which expanded
over the years] in the employment of other lawyers or articled students, or in dealings with
other members of the profession.
As can be seen, this latter conception did not cover discrimination of third parties including potential
and existing clients. See generally, Darryl Robinson, "Ethical Evolution: The Development of the
Professional Handbook of the Law Society of Upper Canada" (1995) 29 Gazette 162 at 190-191 and
Duty of Non-Discrimination,supra note 3 at 517. 1 wish to thank Jim Varro for helping me clarify the
history of Ontario's anti-discrimination rule.
91. Ontario, supra note 24. The Commentary to Rule 5.04(1) also provides that "[t]he right to
equal treatment without discrimination because of sex includes the right to equal treatment without
discrimination because a woman is or may become pregnant."
90.
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circumstances cited in rule

5.04.92

The Commentary to rule 5.04(1) further observes that it would not constitute
discrimination should the differential treatment be designed to "relieve
disadvantage.

93

Another important provision of the anti-discrimination

rule is the obligation in both Ontario and CBA Code for lawyers to take
94 For example, Chapter XX
reasonable steps to prevent discrimination.
of the CBA Code (Commentary 2) obliges lawyers "to take reasonable
steps to prevent or stop discrimination by the lawyer's partner, co-worker,
or by any employee or agent" and that the failure to take such steps "also
violates the duty of non-discrimination." 95
The impact of an anti-discrimination ethical rule can be seen, for
example, in the context of criminal defence work where the zealous
advocate paradigm is seen by many as appropriate given that the client
is pitted against the powerful state. In this context, many defence lawyers
have traditionally believed that they are not accountable for their behaviour
even if it was discriminatory or otherwise harmful. Consider the following
96
two examples involving jury selection and cross-examination.
Jury Selection. On December 3, 1991, Constable Douglas Lines shot
Royan Bagnaut, a young Black male, as he was being pursued in downtown
Toronto for having allegedly stolen a purse with a knife. Lines repeatedly
fired at Bagnaut striking him in the arm and chest. Lines would claim that
he thought Bagnaut had a gun. No gun was ever found. A hunting knife was
later discovered in the lining of Bagnaut's jacket. 97 Lines was ultimately
charged with criminal negligence causing bodily harm and related offences.
In a pre-trial motion, the Crown attempted to prevent Lines' lawyers from
striking prospective jurors from the jury simply because of the colour of
their skin. The Crown argued that this would violate the equality guarantee
of section 15(1) of the Charter.In a criminal trial, the Crown and defence
can remove a juror who would otherwise be on the jury by exercising one
of their allotted peremptory challenges. 98 No reason has to be given by the
92. Ontario,supranote 24. Prior to 1994, there was no explicit recognition that the anti-discrimination
rule embraced substantive rather than formal equality.
93. Ontario,supra note 24.
94. This obligation did not previously exist.
95. See Chapter XX B Non-Discrimination, online: Canadian Bar Association <http://www.cba.org/
CBA/resolutions/pdf/04-01-A.pdf>. The amended Chapter XX was approved in August, 2004.
96. The absence of a discussion of the ethics and equality in these two contexts is discussed in some
detail in The Duty of Non-Discrimination,supranote 3 at 481-482, 484-487.
97. See Wendy Darroch "Police Shooting Victim Stole Purse, Court Told" Toronto Star (8 May
1993) A19.
98. See the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 634(l) of. The number of challenges given to
the parties depends on the seriousness of the offence. In this case, the Crown and defence would have
been entitled to 12 challenges.
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challenging party. The trial judge dismissed the Crown's motion. Justice
Bruce Hawkins held that section 15(1) does not apply to the defence
because it is not a state actor and that the adversarial process demands
that the defence be entitled to use whatever weapons it has available. As
the trial judge put it, "it is fanciful to suggest that in the selection of a jury
[the accused] doffs his adversarial role and joins with the Crown in some
sort of joint and concerted effort to empanel an independent and impartial
tribunal."9 9 According to a media report, at trial, the defence exercised
seven of its allotted twelve challenges. Four of the seven challenges were
used to exclude racialized jurors including at least one Black juror from
the jury box. The jury that ultimately tried the case consisted of 11 White
jurors and one Asian juror.10° Lines was acquitted. 10'
And so, while section 15(1) may or may not prohibit the discriminatory
exercise of peremptory challenges by the defence,"0 2 I would argue that
anti-discrimination ethical rules clearly place a prohibition on the use of
peremptory challenges in this fashion. 03 This context provides a good
example of where the boundary that has often served to demarcate the
ethical limits on behaviour (i.e., the law) will not have caught up to the
substantive norms inherent in law's ambition and how our reconstructed
role morality can serve as a safety mechanism to preserve the system's
integrity.
Cross-Examining A Truthful Sexual Assault Complainant." On
February 3, 1997, a 22-year-old university student was awakened in the
middle of the night and sexually assaulted by a stranger. A set of footprints
in the snow immediately below her unlocked kitchen window revealed
how the perpetrator had broken into the apartment. The search for the
rapist went cold until 2002 when the police were able to link a semen stain
99. See R. v. Lines, [1993] O.J. No. 3284 (Gen. Div.).
100. See Tracey Tyler "Should Juries Reflect Society's Racial Mix" Toronto Star (22 May 1993) D4.
101. See Wendy Darroch "Officer Cleared In Shooting Of Teen Suspect" Toronto Star (18 May 1993)
A2; Tracey Tyler "Crown Appeal Dropped In Officer's Acquittal" Toronto Star (15 November 1994)
A19.
102. In R. v. Brown, [ 1999] O.J. No. 4867 (Gen. Div.), the trial judge concluded that he had jurisdiction
to control the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges by the defence. But see R. v. Gayle
(2001), 154 C.C.C. (3d) 221 at 247-254 (Ont. C.A.) which did not address whether the limits it was
placing on the ability of the Crown to use their peremptory challenges in a discriminatory fashion
applied to the defence.
103. See also Laura 1.Appleman, "Reports of Batson's Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: How
The Batson Doctrine Enforces A Normative Framework Of Legal Ethics" (2005) 78 Temp. L. Rev.
607 for a further discussion of the transformative impact of an anti-discrimination ethical norm injury
selection. Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and its progeny, the prosecutor and defence
counsel are prohibited from exercising their peremptory challenges in a gender or racially biased
manner.
104. All of the facts of this case and quotes from interviews come directly from Christie Blatchford
"The Still, Sad Music Of Humanity" Globe and Mail (6 November 2004).
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on the complainant's pajamas to one Philip Barlow. Over the course of a
month long pre-trial hearing, Barlow challenged the admissibility of the
DNA evidence. His motion failed. At trial, his defence suddenly became
consent. Over a three day period, his lawyer vigorously cross-examined
the complainant. According to a newspaper report, he suggested that she
had consented, that she and Barlow had met at a bar and that she had
brought him home. He even suggested that she concocted a break and
enter story to "cover up a one-night stand of casual sex." Barlow did not
testify. He was convicted and sentenced to six years imprisonment.
While it is unknown what Barlow said to his lawyer about his guilt or
innocence, his lawyer had, at a minimum, constructive knowledge of his
client's guilt given how ludicrous the defence was in the circumstances.' 0 5
It was no more plausible than had it been suggested to the complainant
that the rapist was Barlow's identical twin. In addition, Barlow's lawyer
was aware that his client had been convicted in 1991 of breaking and
entering and that in 1997, the year that this complainant was raped, he had
pleaded guilty to trespass in exchange for the withdrawal of a more serious
charge of prowling at night. °6 The complainant and defence lawyer were
interviewed by Globe and Mail columnist, Christie Blatchford. Blatchford
summarized the complainant's reaction to her brutal cross-examination as
follows:
She was shocked by the minute parsing of what she'd told police right
after the attack-she used 'straddling' and 'lying on me' interchangeably,
for instance, and [the defence lawyer] suggested that the latter implied
she was having consensual sex.
Meanwhile, Barlow's lawyer told Blatchford that:
he contested the DNA evidence on solid legal grounds, and a subsequent
consent defence was not incompatible with that. What's more, he said,
the prosecutor has a positive duty to prove the absence of consent, and
the defence is entitled to make suggestions....
These comments suggest that he was working under the constraints of a
client who had admitted his guilt as they are the classic ways in which
many defence lawyers perceive their role in defending the guilty.
Surprisingly, Blatchford did not question the ethics of the lawyer's
cross-examination and simply observed that "[t]he way ...
[the defence
was] conducted ...
was perfectly proper and played by all Canada's legal
105. For an interesting discussion of when a lawyer knows her client is guilty including circumstances
other than when the client discloses his guilt, see Ethics and Canadian CriminalLaw, supra note 11
at 37-51. The authors argue for an "irresistible knowledge of guilt" standard.
106. See R. v. Barlow, [2002] O.J. No. 5652 (S.C.J.).
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rules." Leaving aside the issue of the legality of the cross-examination
under the "good faith" requirements from Lyttle, I would argue that, in the
circumstances of this case where there was no "air of reality" to a consent
defence, that the non-discrimination rule ethically barred defence counsel
from conducting it. This was a three-day cross-examination that served to
further the historical discrimination and disadvantage faced by women. It
10 7
was humiliating, traumatizing and based on stereotypical assumptions.
The trauma of the cross-examination was particularly accute for the
complainant in this case. As recounted by Blatchford, "because Mr. Barlow
had said, 'I know you guys' before he left on the night in question, she'd
always harboured the nagging suspicion that maybe they had crossed
paths before." And, so when Barlow's lawyer suggested to her that they
had met that night at a bar, "she believed he was actually giving her hard
information, not questioning her." The complainant responded "I did?"
and then "burst into tears."
Do no harm
One of the most common themes expressed throughout professional codes
of conduct in Canada is "do no harm" whether it be harm to your client, to
the tribunal and its fact-finding mission, the profession, opposing counsel,
or the public at large. This is very significant given that this is a fundamental
element of a justice-seeking ethic. There are a number of "do no harm"
exhortations that I want to highlight. The first is the interpretation rule in
Ontario (rule 1.03(1)(b)) which states that:
A lawyer has special responsibilities by virtue of the privileges
afforded the legal profession and the important role it plays in a free
and democratic society and in the administration of justice, including a
special responsibility to ...
protect the dignity of individuals.0 8

The exhortation could not be any more explicit. Lawyers have an ethical
obligation to ensure that their conduct does not harm the dignity of
individuals.
The second is the adoption of the Supreme Court of Canada's approach
to "future harm" in Smith v. Jones in Ontario'0 9 and, more recently by

107. This position is advanced by David Luban. See Lawyers and Justice,supra note 23 at 150-152.
Luban originally favoured a general rule barring cross-examination of all sexual assault complainants.
He later slightly softened his position to cases where on any reasonable view of the facts there was no
consent or where the client privately concedes that there was no consent. See Partisanship,Betrayal
and Autonomy, supra note 54 at 1026-1035. See also Stephen Ellmann, "Lawyering For Justice in
a Flawed Society" (1990) 90 Colum. L. Rev. 116 at 155-157; and the discussion in The Criminal
Defence Lawyer s Role, supra note 16 at 394-396.
108. Ontario, supra note 24.
109. See Rule 2.03(3), Ontario,supra note 24 which came into force 1 November 2000.
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the Canadian Bar Association."' Historically, lawyers in Canada were
prohibited from disclosing confidential information to prevent harm unless
it involved future criminal conduct. This meant, for example, that a lawyer
for the defendant in a torts case could not disclose the discovery that the
plaintiff had a life-threatening injury or disease that had gone undiagnosed
by the plaintiff's doctors."' Under the new Ontario and CBA rules, lawyers
can now disclose confidential information where they have information
that "there is an imminent risk to an identifiable person or group of
death or serious bodily harm, including serious psychological harm that
substantially interferes with health or well-being...." In addition, since
Smith v. Jones recognized that the public safety exception applies to all
"duties of confidentiality," lawyers in other provinces should now be able
to disclose under similar circumstances under the "otherwise authorized
by law" exception to confidentiality." 2
In Ontario, there is a discretion to disclose future harm. It is mandatory
under the CBA regime." 3 It is hard to imagine when it would be just not
to exercise the discretion to disclose, but giving lawyers that discretion is
consistent with the contextual approach to ethics set out infra. The danger
with categorical rules even those created in the interests of justice is that
circumstances will arise that were perhaps not contemplated by the drafters
and which require some flexibility. The case of Marcel Tremblay provides
us with one such case. Tremblay suffered from a fatal lung disease. He
planned to take his own life to ensure that he could die with dignity and
to spark a national debate on the issue of assisted-suicide." 4 As there is no
criminal prohibition on suicide, there was no legal command that could
deny him this right. He was concerned, however, with the possibility that
his family members might be charged under the assisted-suicide provisions

110. See Chapter IV - Confidential Information (Rule 2), online: Canadian Bar Association <http://
www.cba.org/CBA/resolutions/pdf/04-01-A-Annexl .pdfz>. The amendment was approved in August,
2004.
111. This is the classic dilemma from Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W. 2d 704 (Minn. 1962)
[Spaulding]. See the discussion of Spaulding and the different ethical issues raised by the case in
Roger C. Crampton and Lori P. Knowles, "Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions: Spaulding v.
Zimmerman Revisited" (1998-1999) 83 Minn. L. Rev. 63.
112. Proulx and Layton come to a similar conclusion that Smith v. Jones established a "a publicsafety exception to the common law duty of confidentiality. However, they go on to observe that
"[c]ounsel outside of Ontario who relies on this reading of Smith v. Jones to justify disclosure has
nonetheless probably breached the ethical dictates of his or her governing body." See Ethics and
CanadianCriminal Law, supra note II at 233-239.
113. It is unclear whether there is a discretion under Smith . Jones. See Ethics and CanadianCriminal
Law, supra note 11 at 244-245.
114. See Joanne Laucius "Ottawa Man Kills Himself To Draw Attention To Cause" The Gazette (29
January 2005) A 12.
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of the Criminal Code, if they were present during his suicide.115 Tremblay
went to see Lawrence Greenspon, a well-known criminal lawyer in Ottawa
for legal advice. Although Greenspon admitted that he had both moral
and ethical difficulties with Tremblay's decision, he recognized that "[his]
role [was] ... to advise Mr. Tremblay and his family about the possible
implications of the law. It is certainly not for me to make any judgment
' Suppose, however, that Tremblay had
about what he has chosen to do."116
not wanted to publicize his plans in order to die in private without the
intrusion of the state and further suppose that Greenspon was satisfied that
Tremblay was mentally fit to make this decision." 7 Under a mandatory
disclosure regime, Greenspon would have had to, in theory, ignore his
l8
client's request and notify the police."
Returning to the Smith v. Jones conception of future harm which was
explicitly adopted in Ontario, David Layton has argued that it is more
narrow than the previous approach taken in Ontario. Under the previous
exception, a lawyer could disclose confidential information "necessary
to prevent a crime ... if the lawyer has reasonable grounds for believing
that a crime is likely to be committed." 119 He takes this position primarily
because a lawyer can now no longer disclose confidential information to
prevent any crime (his emphasis). I disagree. By taking away the crime
element of the exception, only non-violent crimes such as drug or property
offences are not, in theory, covered by the exception although in many
cases these crimes involve violence and so would trigger the exception. But
more fundamentally, it is precisely by taking away the crime requirement
and adding psychological harm to the mix, that the exception is much
broader than its predecessor. While Layton would ultimately like to see a
future harm exception not saddled with a crime or bodily harm limitation,
I would argue that the Smith v. Jones approach is sufficiently broad enough

115. See the CriminalCode, supra note 98, s. 241, which reads:
Every one who (a) counsels a person to commit suicide, or (b) aids or abets a person to
commit suicide, whether suicide ensues or not, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.
116. Aron Heller and Vito Pilieci "Ailing Kanata Man Plans To Die Tonight: Right-To-Die Advocate
Announces His Suicide" The Ottawa Citizen (28 January 2005). See also Pauline Tam "Tremblay Case
Raises Host Of Ethical Questions" National Post (29 January 2005) A8.
117. While Tremblay had already been seen by two psychiatrists before the police heard of his plan,
they nevertheless insisted that he undergo a further psychiatric evaluation. See Jennifer Pritchett,
Andrew Duffy & Joanne Laucius "Ailing Man 'Had Enough' The Ottawa Citizen (29 January 2005)
A 1. It is this kind of coercive state activity that someone may wish to avoid.
118. Unless, of course, he was prepared to engage in nullification. Nullification is discussed further
infra.
119. See "The Public Safety Exception: Confusing Confidentiality, Privilege and Ethics" (2001) 6
Can. Crim. L. Rev. 217 at 223, 233-238 [The Public Safety Exception].
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to capture the kinds of harm that Layton and others are concerned about. 120
Consider, for example, the following chart of possible harmful conduct:

Type Of Harm

Acts or Threats Of
Violence
Existence Of An
Undiagnosed Harmful
Medical Condition
Client's Intention To
Commit Suicide
Emotional and
Psychological Abuse Of
Child

Defective Medical, 22Drug
or Vehicle Product

Is Disclosure Permitted

Is Disclosure Permitted

Under Current Ontario
and CBA Future Harm
Exception?

Under Old Ontario
CBA Exceptions? and

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes12 1

No

Yes

No

120. See the discussion in Ethics and CanadianCriminalLaw, supra note 11 at 236-241.
121. 1recognize that in its final report (28 April 2000) to Convocation, the Ontario Task Force did, in
fact, recommend that the disclosure exception be broadened to include "... limited disclosure where
a lawyer has reasonable grounds for believing that there is an imminent risk of substantial harm to
the welfare or security of a child or other vulnerable person (Rule 2.03 (4)) and where a lawyer has
reasonable grounds for believing that there is an imminent risk that a fraud that may cause substantial
financial injury to another is likely to be committed (Rule 2.03 (5))." See online: Law Society of Upper
Canada <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/conv/apr2000/RulesTaskForce.PDF>. Convocation ultimately voted
against adding sections (4) and (5). See online: Law Society of Upper Canada <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/
conv/jun2000/special convocation.pdf>. Nevertheless, the emotional and psychological abuse of a
child or indeed other conduct that could be said to create substantial harm to the welfare or security of
a child would clearly trigger the psychological harm of the rule that was passed by Convocation.
122. For example, in the United States, secret settlements in cases involved defective tires (Firestone)
and birth control device (Dalkon Shield) caused widespread devastation. In the case of Firestone, 150
individuals were ultimately killed with another 500 injured. In the case of Dalkon Shield, "the device
was linked to 11 deaths, 209 miscarriages and countless cases of sterilization or birth defects." See
Editorial - "When Secrets Can Be Deadly" San Francisco Chronicle(10 May 2005). To address the
harm caused by non-disclosure clauses in civil settlements, there is legislation pending in California
that would prohibit such clauses where there is a known public danger. See AB 1700, online:
<http://www.aroundthecapital.com/bills/AB_1700>.
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Dangerous Environmental
Hazard

Yes123

No

Wrongful Conviction

Yes, particularly if
the individual were
incarcerated

No

Economic Loss

Arguably where the
victims are vulnerable
(eg., the elderly) and
the scope of the loss is
significant

Yes

Another "do no harm" theme can be seen in the Ontario response to
the Enron crisis and the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. In Ontario, rules
2.02(5.1) and (5.2) require a lawyer to withdraw when she discovers
intended or ongoing dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or illegal conduct
occurring in the organization that retains her and when her attempts of
dissuasion up the ladder of authority within the organization have failed. 124
12
6
125
There are similar requirements in Nova Scotia and the CBA Code
although there is no mandatory withdrawal requirement in the latter. 27 A
mandatory withdrawal obligation should serve as an important deterrent as
it means that unless the company ceases and desists their illegal conduct,
the company will be unable to secure legal advice. Indeed, it could be
argued that withdrawal also requires notification to any new lawyer of
the failure of the organization to cease and desist its unlawful conduct.
If the purpose of the rule is to ensure that organizations are deprived of
123. Layton himself appears to recognize this kind of harm might fall under the Ontario exception.
The PublicSafety Exception, supra note 119 at page 236. As he observes:
But query the case of dangerous environmental hazards or faulty products manufactured by
a client. Also query the situation where a huge fraud would devastate the financial security
of thousands of individuals. Serious bodily harm might be implicated in the former case,
and perhaps in the latter example under the rubric of "serious psychological harm that
substantially interferes with health or well-being."
124. The new rule was approved by Convocation 24 March 2005. See online: Law Society of Upper
Canada <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/services/contents/archive/rpc-archive-en.jsp> and <http://www.lsuc.
on.ca/news/pdf/convmarO4_prcreport.pdf>.
125. See "Honesty and Candour When Advising Clients" (Commentary 4.21 and 4.22) of the Nova
Scotia Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct Handbook Chapter 4, online: Nova Scotia Barristers'
Society <http://www.nsbs.org/legalethics/toc.htm >.
126. See "Confidential Information" (Commentary 12) Chapter IV, online: Canadian Bar Association
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/resolutions/pdf/04-01 -A-Annex I .pdf>.
127. In other provinces, lawyers could go further and disclose the conduct, if it were criminal, under
a future harm exception. For example, "Confidentiality" (Commentary 9), Chapter 5 of the New
Brunswick Rules permits disclosure for crimes not involving violence. See New Brunsvick, supra
note 84.
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legal advice when acting illegally, then any new lawyer must be apprised
of the situation to ensure that they are not duped into representing the
organization.
Before leaving this discussion of"do no harm," it is worth pointing out
that in 1993, the Law Society of Prince Edward Island added the following
Commentary to Chapter IX - The Lawyer As Advocate of their Code of
Professional conduct:
7A. In order to minimize the risk of domestic violence inherent
in many family law matters, the lawyer as advocate in such
proceedings, whether civil or criminal in nature, must avoid all
unnecessary delays in the advancement or defence of an action
from commencement through conclusion.'28
Giving merit a chance

All of the codes of conduct in Canada prohibit lawyers from engaging
in conduct that would mislead the court and jeopardize the chances of a
decision that reflects the legal merit of the dispute or claim. And so we
see requirements that advocates not, for example: knowingly offer or rely
on false evidence; misstate evidence, argument or the law; or deliberately
refrain from informing the court of binding authority that the other party
has not presented. 12 9 There are a number of other exhortations that are
designed to prevent the frustration of the merit of the claim and are thus
integral to a justice-seeking ethic. These include:
" avoiding sharp practice and not taking advantage of or act without fair
warning upon slips or mistakes not going to the merits or involving
the sacrifice of a client's rights. 3 In Alberta, the rule states that "[a]
lawyer must not take advantage of a mistake on the part of another
lawyer if to do so would obtain for the lawyer's client a benefit to
which the client has no bonafide claim or entitlement"' 31 ;
" advising the court to not rely on testimony given in court (including
the client's testimony) that you know is false'32 ; and,

" disclosing to the court that material testimony given by a witness,

128. Online: Law Society of Prince Edward Island <http://www.lspei.pe.ca/pdf/Chapter-IX
Commentary 7A.pdf>.
129. See e.g., Ontario, supra note 24 Rule 4.01(2) and Chapter IX-Lawyer As Advocate
(Commentary 2) CBA, supra note 24.
130. See Ontario, supra note 24 Rule 6.03(3). See also Chapter IX-Lawyer As Advocate
(Commentary 7) CBA, supra note 24.
131. See Chapter 4-Relationship Of The Lawyer To Other Lawyers (Rule 3), Alberta, supra note
87.
132. See Chapter 10-Lawyer As Advocate (Rule 15), Alberta, supra note 87. Only Alberta and New
Brunswick have such provisions although New Brunswick's rule is only triggered vis-A-vis material
evidence.
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including that of the client, is false.133

II. Actualization, empowerment, andmotivation
1. Adopting a pervasivejustice-seekingethic
Having identified a reconstructed role morality that takes the pursuit of
justice as its guiding principle, all lawyers need to take the next step and
adopt a pervasive justice-seeking ethic in all facets of their professional
role. How is such an ethic actualized? The answer is, as Simon recognizes,
the engagement of contextualjudgment. It is a style of judgment that is
concerned with substance over procedure and purpose over form. 13 4 As
opposed to rule-based categorical thinking, contextual judgment involves
discretionary decision-making. It requires an assessment of all of the
relevant factors that impact on the justice of the relevant claim and/or
proposed course(s) of action including interests other than those that relate
to the client. Relevant factors include:
the legal merit of the claim or conduct, defined in substantive terms.
This includes assessing whether the anti-discrimination norm is
engaged and/or whether history has taught us that enforcement of
the positivist law will contribute to injustice;
*

whether the anti-discrimination norm is engaged by the procedure
or process involved;

*

the nature of the work (e.g., transactional or litigation; civil or
criminal);

*

the nature of the client (e.g., individual or corporate entity; privileged
or disadvantaged and marginalized);

*

whether there is a power imbalance between the parties including
whether all of the parties are represented by competent lawyers;

*

whether there are any other factors that will impact on the ability of
the process or procedure to produce the legally correct result; and,

133. See Chapter 9-Lawyer As Advocate (Rule 12), New Brunswick, supra note 84. The rule is
discretionary as the lawyer can choose to withdraw or ask the court not to rely on the testimony.
134. The Practiceof Justice, supra note 2 at 139-149.
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*

the nature and extent of the harm that has been or will be caused by
the client.'

Contextual judgment is in no way foreign to lawyers in this country.
Our common law is now largely governed by contextual principles such
as reasonableness in criminal and tort law, the "best interests of the child"
in family law, or the repute of the administration of justice in Charter
litigation. In the law of evidence, for example, the Supreme Court has
now rejected categorical reasoning in favour of a more flexible principled
approach to admissibility.'36 Our statutes also require contextual decisionmaking. Consider, for example, section 276(3) of the Criminal Code
which identifies the factors to be taken into account when determining
the admissibility of a complainant's prior sexual history under section
276(2):
276(3)

In determining whether evidence is admissible under subsection
(2), the judge ... shall take into account

(a)

the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to
make full answer and defence;

(b)

society's interest in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault
offences;

(c)

whether there is a reasonable prospect that the evidence will
assist in arriving at a just determination in the case;

(d)

the need to remove from the fact-finding process any
discriminatory belief or bias;

135. Thinking Like a Lawyer (1998), supra note 17. To illustrate the importance of context, it is
instructive to return to the trial of Queen Caroline. While many have used Lord Brougham's speech
as the justification for zealous protection of the client's interests, Simon has correctly pointed out that
properly placed in context, it is really more a vigorous defence of a client's rights and ultimately of
justice than interest:
Brougham's threat [to disclose the King's will and potentially bring down the monarchy]
was based on a far more complex set ofjudgments than simply the Queen's interests would
be served by producing King George's will. In the first place, Brougham believed that
his client was factually innocent of the acts with which she was charged. In the second
place, the secret marriage was centrally relevant to an important substantive defense: if
George had been married previously, then his later marriage to Caroline was invalid, and
she was legally incapable of adultery. In the third place, Brougham shared the popular view
that, even if the charges had been true, this extraordinary prosecution would have been
inappropriate given the King's outrageous mistreatment of his wife from the beginning of
their marriage.
See Thinking Like a Lawyer (1998), supra note 17 at 6-7.
136. See e.g., R. v. Starr (2000), 147 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.); R. v. Handy (2002), 164 C.C.C. (3d)
481 (S.C.C.).
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(e)

the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of
prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury;

(f)

the potential prejudice to the complainant's personal dignity
and right of privacy;

(g)

the right of the complainant and of every individual to personal
security and to the full protection and benefit of the law.... 37

We also see a recognition that lawyers regularly engage in complex
judgments in the law on negligence and ineffective assistance of
counsel.' 38
In some cases, contextual judgment will call for conduct that is
inconsistent with the prevailing code of conduct or the positivist law.
This could occur, for example, where the codes have not caught up to
the demands of a justice-seeking ethic, the positivist law is unjust, or
where there is no other way to ensure a just result. In order to empower
lawyers to deal with this situation, Simon suggests that lawyers engage
in what he calls ad hoc nullification. As he points out, there is already
institutionalized nullification in the criminal justice system. The police do
not enforce all laws and even when they discover a violation, they do not
always lay a charge. Prosecutors sometimes dismiss charges because of
the unconstitutional behaviour of the police. Judges sometimes refuse to
strictly apply precedent in order to achieve a substantively just result and,
in some cases, juries will refuse to convict a guilty person because of their
dislike of the law or manner in which the evidence was obtained.
According to Simon, nullification should not be viewed as a recipe for
lawlessness but rather a re-orientation of prevailing norms to ensure the
actualization of the goals of the profession and to assist the pursuit ofjustice
when procedures break down. As he puts it "the lawyer should defy the
rule, not as an act of lawlessness, but as an act of principled commitment
to legal values more fundamental than those that support the rule."' 39

Nullification is a powerful means of individual empowerment and should
provide some comfort to the radical lawyer who thinks that role morality,
even as reconstructed in the interests of justice, may be too conservative
for meaningful and transformative lawyering. There are different forms
of nullification including refusing to represent certain kinds of cases
(e.g., sexual assault cases or cases involving police officers charged with
shooting racialized individuals) even if you were the last lawyer in town,
137. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
138. See generally Folland v. Reardon, [2005] O.J. No. 216 at para. 44 (C.A.). See also Joanisse,
supra note 47 at 61.
139. The PracticeofJustice, supra note 2 at 164.
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engaging in zealous advocacy that would otherwise not be permitted under
a justice-seeking ethic, relying on ethical norms from other jurisdictions,
wilful blindness (e.g., not asking your client for admissions that would
trigger a lawyer's obligation not to mislead the court), breaching the codes
of conduct, or even breaking the law.
Although nullification occurs in the criminal justice system and
zealous advocacy is itself often a recipe for nullification of the substantive
norms inherent in law, it is a practice that is not generally accepted in
the profession, particularly where the conduct involves violating the rule
of law. 4 ° It will, therefore, require considerable courage and motivation.
It is here where personal responsibility comes into play. A lawyer must
take responsibility for the circumstances under which he or she would
be prepared to engage in nullification. A lawyer must also be prepared
to acknowledge their use of nullification and bar organizations must be
prepared to openly address this issue, provide advice, and ultimately
14 1
institutionalize it.

My own view of criminal law advocacy is largely based on
principles of nullification. It is well documented that the criminal justice
system is inherently biased towards racialized groups. 142 And so, with
respect to Black and Aboriginal accused, for example, racial profiling,
biased decision-making in bail, verdicts and sentencing have led to an
adversarial process that can no longer guarantee a result obtained in a
non-discriminatory fashion. As a result, I believe that criminal defence

140. The concept of nullification is also problematic given that it could also be used by those seeking
to subvert justice. In the United States, we have seen this in southern cases involving Black accused.
See In Defense of Law and Morality, supra note 37 at 279-280. In Canada, we have also seen juries
likely use unconscious nullification in cases involving White police officers charged with shooting
young Black men. See Gabriella Pedicelli, When Police Kill: Police Use of Force in Montreal and
Toronto (Montreal: Vhicule Press, 1998) at Chapter 4.
141. See e.g., the discussion in Robert M. Palumbos, "Within Each Lawyer's Conscience A
Touchstone: Law, Morality And Attorney Civil Disobedience" (2005) 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1057 at
1092-1096.
142. The number of Royal Commissions and inquiries documenting this are too numerous to be
cited. They include: Report Of The Commission Of Inquiry Into Matters Relating To The Death of
Neil Stonechild (October 2004), online: The Stonechild Inquiry <http://www.stonechildinquiry.
ca/finalreport/default.shtml>; Legacy Of Hope: An Agenda For Change, Final Report From The
Commission On First Nations and Metis Peoples And Justice Reform (June 2004), online: Justice
Reform Commission <http://www.justicereformcomm.sk.ca>; Report of the Commission on Systemic
Racism in the Ontario CriminalJustice System (Toronto: Queen's Printer, December 1995); Report of
the AboriginalJustice Inquiry of Manitoba (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1991); Royal Commission on
the DonaldMarshallJr Prosecution(Halifax: Queen's Printer, 1989). See also, Clayton James Mosher,
DiscriminationandDenial. Systemic Racism In Ontario s Legal and CriminalJusticeSystems, 18921961 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998); Frances Henry, Carol Tator, Winston Mattis & Tim
Rees, The Colour of Democracy: Racism In CanadianSociety (Toronto: Nelson, 1998) at Chapters 5
& 6; R. v. Gladue (1999), 133 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.); R. v. Borde (2002), 172 C.C.C. (3d) 225 at
236 (Ont. C.A.); andR. v. Parks (1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (Ont. C.A.).
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lawyers have a substantial licence to engage in zealous advocacy when
representing accused from racialized or other marginalized communities.
The difficult question remains how far you are prepared to push the
nullification envelope in the interests of justice. I provide one situation for
reflection and debate.
Misleading Cross-Examination. Let us assume that you have an
Aboriginal client who is charged with possession of a small pocket knife.
On the night of your client's arrest, the police had been patrolling a socalled high crime area in Halifax and decided to stop and search your
client. Your client admits that he was in possession of the knife but feels
that he was targeted because he is Aboriginal. You agree and file a Charter
application. It is dismissed. The case proceeds to trial. The arresting officer
is the first witness. You suggest to the officer in cross-examination, that the
only reason he stopped your client was because he was a young Aboriginal
male. The officer denies the suggestion. You then suggest that the officer
realized that his conduct might be later scrutinized and, so he concocted
a story about finding a knife on your client. The suggestion is denied.
Since the lawyer would not have a "good faith" basis to believe that the
suggestion is true, the question would violate the legal and ethical rule
set out in Lyttle. However, is it an appropriate case for nullification given
the relevant social context? 43 What about if the client wanted to testify
that he was not in possession of a knife that night? Would this form of
nullification be ethical?
2. Identity lawyering in the interests ofjustice
I want to end this article with a discussion of a potential source of motivation
for a justice-seeking ethic. In "Beyond Bleached-Out Professionalism",
David Wilkins examines the "relationship between a lawyer's group-based
identity and her professional role."' 44 As he points out, the traditional
approach to professionalism "requires lawyers to check their identities at
the door when performing their professional roles.... [B]ecoming a lawyer
means adopting a 'professional self' that supercedes all other aspects of

143. A very similar scenario is provided by David Layton in The Criminal Defence Lawyer ' Role,
supra note 16 at 400.
144. "Beyond 'Bleached Out' Professionalism: Defining Professional Responsibility for Real
Professionals" in D.L. Rhode, ed., Ethics In Practice:Lawyers 'Roles,Responsibilities,andRegulations
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 209 [Beyond Bleached Out Professionalism].The term
"bleached-out professionalism" comes from S. Levinson, "Identifying The Jewish Lawyer: Reflections
On The Construction of Professional Identity" (1992-1993) 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1577.
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the lawyer's identity." '45 Justice is colour, gender, or religion blind so the
rhetoric goes and therefore, this part of the self is seen as irrelevant. As
Wilkins observes:
It is not surprising that bleached out professionalism has become a
core professional ideal. Norms such as neutrality, objectivity, and
predictability are central to American legal culture. Lawyers are the
gatekeepers through which citizens gain access to these important legal
goods. If the law is to treat individuals equally, the argument goes, then
lawyers must not allow their nonprofessional commitments to interfere
with their professional obligation to give their clients unfettered access to
all that the law has to offer. A professional ideology that treats a lawyer's
nonprofessional identity as relevant
to her professional conduct appears
46
to threaten this important role.1
This formalized bleaching out occurred in Canada from 1876 to 1951
when Aboriginal lawyers had to give up their status of "Indian.' ' 47 Today,
it occurs more informally. Indeed, many traditionally excluded lawyers
likely feel that they need to go great lengths to prove that their loyalty is
to the profession.
Wilkins is rightly critical of this traditional conception of
professionalism. As he argues, the problem is that by encouraging lawyers
to not engage in identity lawyering (i.e. letting their non-professional self
or group affiliations impact on their thinking process), we are perpetuating
the systemic biases that exist in society and in the legal profession.
This is certainly the case in Canada where there is now overwhelming
evidence that justice is neither gender nor colour blind. "Bleached out
professionalism" has and continues to be a powerful means of socialization
that has ensured that the White middle class male heterosexual privilege
that has historically guided the direction of the profession is not threatened
by a more diverse group of lawyers.

145. Beyond Bleached Out Professionalism,supra note 144 at 209. Wilkins further notes that:
In addition to the benefits that bleached out professionalism offers to the consumers of
legal services, it also appears to safeguard the interests of the women and men who become
lawyers. ... This 'professional' status is particularly important for the profession's new
entrants-Jews, women, blacks, and other racial and religious minorities-who, in their
nonprofessional lives, have been subject to discrimination on the basis of certain aspects
of their identities. These traditional outsiders have a powerful stake in being viewed
as lawyers simpliciter; freed by their professional status from the pervasive weight of
negative identity-specific stereotypes.
Finally, bleached out professionalism appears to uphold the legal system's core commitment
to the fundamental equality of persons.
146. Beyond Bleached Out Professionalism,supra note 144 at 211.
147. See Indian Act, 1876, S.C. 1876, c. 18, s.86(1) as discussed in Gender and Race, supra note
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By bleaching out identity, we are losing an important voice that can
identify inequality and other systemic problems in the legal profession
which is a critical component of contextual thinking under a justiceseeking ethic. As Wilkins persuasively argues, contrary to popular belief,
group consciousness doesn't make lawyers less neutral or objective - just
the opposite in fact. Indeed, as he points out, feminist legal scholars have
played an important role in advancing an alternative dispute resolution
model. 4 8 In addition, since identity gives individuals special reasons
for "caring about others who share their identity and to work together to
advance the interests of their group" - we are losing a vital source of passion
and commitment for the pursuit of social justice and a justice-seeking
ethic. 149 Of course, as Wilkins notes, there is still a legitimate questionwhere do you draw the line? What aspects of one's non-professional self
should be expressed in lawyering? I would argue that the focus should be
on attributes that are relevant to group advancement, social justice, and
fundamental fairness.

150

Conclusion
This article has attempted to demonstrate that the role morality of the legal
profession in Canada has been evolving over the last fifteen years. With
this reconstruction, the emphasis of lawyering is slowly shifting away
from zealous pursuit of the client's cause within the bounds of the law
to the pursuit of the cause of justice. That pursuit demands that lawyers
engage in behaviour that will enhance a fair, other-regarding, and nondiscriminatory process of problem-solving and that will protect the right
of the client to obtain the remedy he or she is entitled to under the law
properly interpreted.
There are likely to be many sceptics. Some will argue that I have failed
to present sufficient evidence of a reconstruction. To them, I urge patience
as this is a work in progress. Others, without denying the importance of

148. Beyond Bleached Out Professionalism,supranote 144 at 218.
149. Beyond Bleached Out Professionalism, supra note 144 at 219-220, 223.

150. Beyond Bleached Out Professionalism, supra note 144 at 222-234. In the United States, the
issue of identity lawyering has been particularly acute in the context of client selection. For example,
the question has been raised as to whether a racialized lawyer should use identity consciousness to
refuse to prosecute certain criminal offences because of systemic racism in the justice system. It is
now commonly referred to as "the Darden dilemma" following the selection of Chris Darden, an
African American, to prosecute O.J. Simpson and his subsequent attempts to exclude the audiotapes
that exposed his main witness, Mark Furhman, as a racist. See K.B. Nunn, "'The Darden Dilemma':
Should African Americans Prosecute Crimes?" (2000) 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1473. In the context of
gender, see the discussion of the Nathansan case in the forum discussion at (1998) 20 W. New Eng. L.
Rev. 23-142. Judith Nathanson, a well known Massachusetts divorce lawyer, was successfully sued by
a male client for discrimination. Nathanson refused to represent men in divorce cases in her effort to
bring out about systemic changes in family law.
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the anti-discrimination and do no harm norms now incorporated in our
codes, will view the reforms as nothing more than political window
dressing designed to convince the public that self-regulation works and
that the profession is motivated by the public interest. These sceptics will
point to the impossibility of trying to institutionalize justice in a profession
and economy that is so driven by the bottom line and where institutional
culture, particularly 6lite law firm culture, too often defeats the best of
intentions.'5
These are valid concerns. Much of the reorientation and resistance
will require structural changes including the re-thinking of self-regulation
and law school pedagogy. It will require a commitment to interpreting and
applying all of the rules in a manner consistent with ajustice-seeking ethic.
And finally, as I have said repeatedly throughout this piece, we will need
stronger leadership from the Canadian Bar Association and law societies.
However, before we move on to institutional reform, we need to have a set
of meaningful and workable standards. Unfortunately, we have only had
few attempts in Canada to set out systemically a coherent theory of ethical
lawyering. 52 This article attempts to fill in the gap.
A final group of sceptics will argue that a justice-seeking ethic simply
places too much emphasis on legal values and law's ambition. While
there is no question that the law has often been corrupted in favour of the
dominant groups by those interpreting and applying it, in my view, the
law can be a powerful means of securing justice. The recognition of samesex marriages, for example, would likely never have occurred without
Halpern and other similar cases. Moreover, as I have tried to argue, a
justice-seeking ethic does not rest solely on positivist law but rather asks
lawyers to properly interpret the law by examining its consistency with
151. For example, in her 1993-1994 study of lawyers in British Columbia, Joan Brockman found that
73% of women and 45% of men indicated that they thought that the anti-discrimination rule in British
Columbia's code of conduct would not be effective or were not optimistic about its effectiveness. See
Use of Self-Regulation, supra note 30 at 217. See also, Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis, eds.,
Lawyers & Society: The Common Law World (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1988). As Jerome Bickenbach notes:
Abel has argued that there is no empirical evidence that legal practitioners are, because of
their professional status, able to rise above the profit motive in order to serve the public
interest. Not only is the moral mandate of law blatant PR, none of the standard features of
professionalism are actually manifested in practice.
See "The Redemption of the Moral Mandate of the Profession of Law" (1996) 9 Can. J. L. & Jur. 51
at 56.
152. These include the works ofAllan C. Hutchinson (see Legal Ethics andProfessionalResponsibility,
supra note 23; "Calgary and Everything After: A Postmodern Re-Vision Of Lawyering" (1994-1995)
33 Alta. L. Rev. 768); Rosemary Cairns Way (see Reconceptualizing ProfessionalResponsibility,
supra note 57); Richard Devlin (see Normative and Somewhere To Go, supra note 67) and Randal
N.M. Graham, Legal Ethics: Theories, Cases and Professional Responsibility (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 2004).
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substantive legal norms including fairness, equality, and harm reduction
and with special attention to our history of injustice.
This article has also had more modest ambitions. For those seeking a
meaningful practice of law, I have tried to chart a course that will identify
some basic obligations owed by lawyers in the pursuit of justice and how
a justice-seeking ethic can be actualized. Perhaps more importantly, I have
attempted to identify a course of redemption by pointing largely to codebased developments that can provide support, courage and ultimately
justification for justice-seeking lawyers. There is no longer any excuse.

